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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the district court erred in granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
(Justiciability), effectively ruling that no justiciable controversy exists with 
respect to two provisions of Utah's initiative statute. 
Although neither Defendants' motion nor the district court's ruling references Rule 
12(b)(6), Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Justiciability) is grounded in that rule. This Court 
reviews the district court's decision de novo. Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 2001 UT 25, {^10, 21 P.3d 198. This issue was preserved in the trial court by 
motion. See R. at 311-13 (Defendants' Motion); id. at 326-36 (Safe Havens' opposition 
memorandum); id. at 411-17 (Defendants' reply memorandum); id. at 499-504 (ruling). 
2. Whether the district court erred in denying Safe Havens' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and in granting Defendants' Cross-Motion, effectively ruling that 
three provisions of Utah's initiative statute are constitutional. 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol 2003 UT 19, %5970 P.3d 72. On 
appeal, "[t]he trial court's resolution of the legal issues [presented in a summary judgment 
motion] is accorded no deference since entitlement to summary judgment is a question of 
law." Kouris, 2003 UT 19, ^|5. These issues were preserved in the trial court. R. at 36-39 
(Safe Havens' motion); id. at 370-410 (Defendants' opposition); id. at 337-39 (Defendants' 
cross-motion); id. at 434-97 (Safe Havens' reply memorandum); id. at 499-504 (ruling). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Safe Havens challenges the constitutionality of five provisions of Utah's Election Code: 
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-201 (2)(a)(ii), which requires that sponsors of citizen 
initiatives obtain signatures equal to 10% of the total of all votes cast for governor in 
26 of Utah's 29 Senate districts ("the Senate District Requirement"); 
• Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-202(4)(a), which requires sponsors of citizen 
initiatives to qualify their petition for the general election ballot "no later than one year 
after the application is filed" ("the One-Year Requirement"); 
• Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-202(5)(d), which requires the lieutenant governor to 
automatically reject, at the initial application stage, any citizen initiative that is 
"identical or substantially similar to" any initiative submitted to the lieutenant governor 
for certification within the last two years ("the Same-or-Similar Ban'5); 
• Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-204.1, which requires sponsors of citizen initiative to 
notice, hold, and document "at least seven public hearings throughout Utah" in various 
specific locations, even before circulating the initiative for signatures ("the Public 
Meetings Requirement"); and 
• Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-205(3), which allows signers of citizen initiative 
petitions to remove their names from the petitions after the petitions have been 
submitted to the county clerks ("the Signature Removal Provisions"). 
Safe Havens asserts that these statutes violate the following constitutional provisions: 
• Article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, which reserves to the people of 
the State of Utah the power to initiate legislation; 
• Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution, which guarantees to the people of 
the State of Utah the uniform operation of the laws; 
• Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution, which guarantees to the people of 
the State of Utah freedom of speech; 
• the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantee 
to the citizens of the United States freedom of speech and political expression. 
Finally, Safe Havens' lawsuit was filed pursuant to the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq. The full text of each of these statutes and constitutional 
provisions can be found in the addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Safe Havens filed this action on April 30, 2003, seeking declaratory relief that either 
(a) the 2003 amendments to Utah's Election Code were not retroactive and could not be 
applied to its citizen initiative filed in March 2003, before the new law took effect, or (b) five 
separate provisions of Utah's Election Code violated both the Utah and U.S. Constitutions. 
Safe Havens filed a motion for speedy hearing, and the parties stipulated to an 
accelerated schedule. Safe Havens filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 5, 2003. 
Defendants opposed Safe Havens' motion, and filed both a Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment as well as a Motion to Dismiss (Justiciability), asking that the district court hold that 
no justiciable controversy existed with respect to two of the challenged provisions, and to hold 
all of the provisions constitutional. During the briefing period, Defendants took the 
depositions of two professional initiative campaign consultants. No other discovery was had. 
The motions came before the district court for hearing on June 16, 2003. Three days 
later, the district court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Justiciability) and Defendants' 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Safe Havens' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. On June 30, 2003, the district court entered a final Order and Judgment. On July 
2, 2003, Safe Havens filed its Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Legislative Journey of the Guns-in-Schools Issue: Despite the Wishes of a Vast 
Majority ofUtahns, the Legislature Ultimately Allows Guns in Schools 
Some years ago, the Utah legislature enacted a law stating that "[a] person who 
possesses a weapon . . . in a public or private elementary or secondary school, on the grounds 
of the school, or in those parts of a building, park, or stadium which are being used for an 
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activity sponsored by the school is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." See Utah Code Ann. § 
53 A-3-502 (repealed 2003). The only exceptions were for persons who had obtained advance 
permission from "the responsible school administrator," or persons using the weapon "in 
connection with a lawful, approved activity." Id. There was no exception for persons allowed 
to carry concealed weapons pursuant to a state permit. Id. 
In 1992, the Utah legislature enacted a conflicting law, which made it a misdemeanor 
to possess any dangerous weapon "on or about school premises." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-505.5. However, this new law created an exception for "persons authorized to possess a 
firearm" pursuant to a Utah concealed weapons permit. Id. At the time, though, relatively few 
Utahns had concealed weapons permits because an applicant was required to show "cause" 
to obtain a permit. See R. at 106-07 (1994 version of Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-704). 
In 1995, the legislature liberalized Utah's concealed weapons law, making it possible 
to obtain a concealed weapons permit without demonstrating any "cause." The new law 
allows anyone who applies and "is of good character" to secure a permit. Utah Code Ann. § 
53-5-704(1). Since 1995, the number of Utahns possessing concealed weapons permits has 
grown from around 1,000 to over 51,000. R. at 108 (stating that "the number of Utahns 
allowed to carry a concealed weapon went from 1,000 six years ago to more than 30,000" in 
2001); id. at 112 (stating that there were "51,564 total valid permits as of Dec. 31, 2002"). 
Before and after the 1995 legislation liberalizing the concealed weapons statute was 
passed, representatives of the Utah PTA and other education groups informed legislators and 
staffers that the new law would create a conflict between the section of the Utah Code that 
forbids weapons in schools (53A-3-502) and one that allows concealed weapons permit 
holders to carry concealed weapons into schools (76-10-505.5). The legislature responded that 
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it was aware of the problem, but did not have time to address the issue in the 1995 legislative 
session, and would fix the conflict in future legislative sessions. R. at 116-17. 
As time went by, however, the Utah legislature did nothing to fix the conflict. 
Meanwhile, education officials were unsure whether the burgeoning numbers of concealed 
weapons permit holders could lawfully carry their weapons into schools. Id. at 117. 
Beginning in approximately 1996, education groups pressed for a legislative solution to the 
statutory conflict. Educators (along with other groups) drafted a bill eliminating the conflict 
by prohibiting concealed weapons permit holders from carrying weapons into Utah schools, 
and obtained powerful legislative sponsors, including Senate President Lane Beattie and Rep. 
Dave Jones. Id. 
Despite their extensive efforts, however, the education groups and their legislative 
allies were not able to advance the bill out of legislative committees. In most years the bill did 
not even progress into a legislative committee. See id. In fact, some legislators grew 
impatient with the education groups' continued efforts to address the issue through legislation, 
making comments such as "How many times do we have to say no?" See id. at 123 
(comments of Rep. Blake Chard, R-Layton). Indeed, the legislature seemed completely 
unconcerned that an overwhelming majority of Utahns, when asked about the subject in 
numerous and varied scientific opinion polls, were in favor of banning guns from schools. See 
R. at 123, 125, 129, 131, 132, 135, 138 (seven scientific public opinion polls conducted 
between 1998 and 2001 by three polling agencies, showing that 65% to 93% of Utahns want 
to ban guns from schools). 
In the 2003 legislative session, the Utah legislature resolved the statutory conflict 
regarding guns in schools by repealing Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-502. R. at 140-46 (S.B. 108); 
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id. at 153 (stating that S.B. 108 passed March 3,2003, was signed by the Governor on March 
19, 2003, and became effective May 5, 2003). After the 2003 amendment, the law is now 
clear that, despite the apparent wishes of an overwhelming majority of Utah citizens, and 
despite Safe Havens' efforts that continued into the 2003 legislative session, concealed 
weapon permit holders may carry concealed weapons into Utah schools. 
The Constitutional Alternative to an Unresponsive Legislature: The Initiative Process 
The Utah Constitution states that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the people." See 
Utah Const, art I, § 2. The people of Utah retained unto themselves, in the state Constitution, 
the power to initiate legislation. Utah Const, art. VI, § 1(1) ("[t]he Legislative power of the 
State shall be vested in . . . the Legislature of the State of Utah; and. . . the people of the State 
of Utah"). In other words, the people of Utah yielded some of their power to create law to the 
legislature, but explicitly retained the right to make law by popular initiative. The Utah 
Constitution specifically reserves unto the people of Utah the power and the right to "initiate 
any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for adoption." Id. at art VI, 
§ 1 (2)(a)(i)(A). However, the Utah Constitution by necessity leaves to the legislature the task 
of enacting a statutory scheme under which the people's initiative right may be exercised. Id. 
at art. VI, § l(2)(a)(i) ("[t]he legal voters of the State of Utah" may initiate legislation "in the 
numbers, under the conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute"). 
In 1917, the legislature passed the first initiative statute, setting forth the conditions 
under which Utah citizens could place initiatives on the ballot. In that initial statute, the 
legislature required that initiative proponents gather signatures equal to 10% of the votes cast 
for all candidates for governor in the last general election, and required that proponents meet 
the 10% threshold statewide and in 15 of the 29 counties. R. at 156-62. In 1987, the 
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legislature added a signature removal requirement, granting any voter who has signed an 
initiative petition the right to have his or her signature removed from the petition by filing a 
notarized statement with the appropriate county clerk. This removal right, which still exists 
in the statute, does not terminate until the county clerks transmit the signatures to the 
lieutenant governor. R. at 163. In 1995, the legislature amended the statute to require that 
all signatures be submitted to the county clerks no later than "June 1 before the regular general 
election," and required the county clerks to check and verify all signatures during the month 
of June, and submit the verified signatures to the lieutenant governor's office "no later than 
July 1." R. at 183-88. 
In 1998, the legislature toughened the multi-county requirement, increasing the number 
of counties in which initiative sponsors must reach the 10% threshold from 15 to 20. R. at 
189. The sponsor of the amendments, Rep. Kevin Garn, defended his bill during floor debates: 
[S]ome people would suggest that this will make citizens' initiatives more 
difficult. My answer to that is very simple. Citizens' initiatives ought to be held 
to a little higher standard. The reason I say that is this is the place right here for 
citizens' initiatives. 
R. at 190. Opponents of Rep. Garn's amendment pointed out that there was no need to make 
it more difficult to place initiatives on the ballot, since few initiatives even qualify for the 
ballot in Utah. Indeed, since 1960 only eighteen (18) citizens' measures have even qualified 
for the ballot, and, of those, only four (4) have been approved by a majority of Utahns in the 
general election. On average, then, only one citizens' initiative per decade manages to 
become law in Utah. R. at 198. However, Rep. Garn's amendment ultimately passed. 
In 2002, a group of Utah citizens worked to place an initiative known as the Radioactive 
Waste Restrictions Act ("RWRA") on the ballot. The RWRA's sponsors obtained roughly 
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131,000 signatures, substantially more than the 76,180 signatures required to reach the 
statewide 10% threshold. County clerks verified nearly 96,000 of those signatures. See 
Gallivan v. Walker. 2002 UT 89,ffl[6-l 1, 54 P.3d 1069. In addition, the RWRA's sponsors 
managed to reach the 10% threshold in 26 of the 29 counties. 
At that point, however, well-heeled opponents of the RWRA obtained copies of the 
signatures from the county clerks, and, between June 1 and July 1, went door-to-door visiting 
initiative signers. The opponents, often with notaries public in tow, tried to convince the 
signers to recant and sign a notarized statement directing the county clerks to remove their 
names from the petition. Opponents successfully persuaded thousands of Utahns to remove 
their names from the petition, and, in so doing, reduced the number of counties in which 
RWRA sponsors had reached the 10% threshold from 26 to 14. Id. at ffl[8-9. A t t h a t Point> it 
was too late for sponsors to gather additional signatures to counter the door-to-door campaign. 
Because RWRA sponsors had not reached the 10% threshold in 20 counties, the lieutenant 
governor declared the petition insufficient and refused to certify it for the ballot. Id. at Tfl 1. 
RWRA sponsors then filed a petition for an extraordinary writ with this Court, asking 
this Court to strike down the multi-county requirement as a violation of the Utah and U.S. 
Constitutions. On August 26, 2002, this Court granted the sponsors' requested relief, and 
declared that the multi-county requirement was unconstitutional because, inter alia, it unduly 
burdened the fundamental right to place initiatives on the ballot. Id. 
Legislative reaction to Gallivan was harsh—several legislators went on record criticizing 
Gallivan and vowing to change the law. See R. at 199, 202, 204, 206 (comments of Rep. 
Garn, Rep. Stephens, and Sen. Mansell). In the 2003 legislative session, the legislature 
enacted S.B. 28, substantially revising the initiative statute. Among other changes, S.B. 28: 
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• reinstituted a geographic restriction, replacing the unconstitutional 20-of-29-
counties requirement with the new Senate District Requirement mandating 
that sponsors meet the 10% threshold in 26 of Utah's 29 state Senate districts. 
• instituted the Public Meetings Requirement mandating that sponsors notice, 
hold, and document at least seven public meetings in different cities around the 
state, all before being allowed to even circulate initiative petitions for signature. 
• removed the provisions allowing initiative sponsors to use gathered signatures 
for two election cycles. Under the new One-Year Requirement, initiative 
sponsors must gather sufficient signatures within one year of the initiative 
application filing date. Sponsors who fall short of the required number of 
signatures will be required to re-gather all signatures the next time around. 
• instituted a new requirement (the Same-or-Similar Ban) mandating that the 
lieutenant governor reject any initiative if it is "identical or substantially similar 
to" any initiative submitted within the last two years. This provision will 
potentially allow initiative proponents to file sham initiatives for the sole 
purpose of disqualifying future real initiatives. 
Although the legislature changed many aspects of the initiative law during the 2003 revision, 
it specifically did not alter the Signature Removal Provisions. R. at 208-20 (S.B. 28). 
During legislative debates on the 2003 amendments, the legislature was keenly aware 
of GaUiyan and this Court's admonition that the initiative right could not be unduly burdened. 
The legislature's own attorneys issued the following warning in a "Legislative Review Note": 
In Gallivan [], the Utah Supreme Court declared that the statewide initiative is a 
fundamental right. In analyzing any restrictions placed upon a fundamental right 
by the Legislature, the court must find that there is a compelling state interest that 
justifies restrictions on the right. The court also declared that, because the 
statewide initiative is a fundamental right, the Legislature may not place an 
"undue burden" on the initiative right. The court's opinion also suggested that it 
was the Legislature's duty to "facilitate" the initiative right. 
. . . . [S]ome or all of [S.B. 28] could be declared unconstitutional, depending 
upon the opinion of a majority of justices about whether or not each provision 
"unduly burdens" the fundamental right of initiative or whether or not the interest 
the state asserts in support of the provision is "compelling." 
R. at 221. Indeed, some legislators argued during the floor debates that certain features of the 
new initiative law did in fact impose an undue burden on the initiative right, and were likely 
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unconstitutional. R. at 227-28 (Sen. Thomas questioning the constitutionality of the One-Year 
Requirement); id. at 231-32 (Sen. Stephenson questioning the constitutionality of the Same-or-
Similar Ban, largely because of a concern about sham initiatives, and stating that if the ban 
were enacted, the legislature would be "holding the people to a different standard than we hold 
ourselves"); id- at 235 (Sen. Valentine questioning the constitutionality of the Public Meetings 
Requirement); id- at 247 (Sen. Hale questioning the constitutionality of the Public Meetings 
Requirement); id. at 237,247-48 (Sen. Mayne stating that the entire bill was "worth[y of] the 
junk pile," noting that the Senate District Requirement would have "a very chilling effect on 
the initiative process," and warning that the result of passing the bill would be that "citizens 
will hardly ever, ever have an opportunity to address their government through the initiative 
process"); id- at 253, 257 (Rep. Becker stating that the new law makes the initiative process 
"so difficult that my guess is, unless someone comes in with an enormous amount of money, 
they will never get an initiative on the ballot," and cautioning that if the bill passes "we're 
going to be [in] court within six months, and the chances of us succeeding, if you look at the 
Constitutional note, probably aren't that great"); id. at 259-60 (comments of Rep. Philpot). 
Despite these warnings, the legislature passed the bill. Some of the bill's supporters 
clearly articulated their rationale for making it harder to place initiatives on the ballot. Rep. 
Noel stated that "we have a representative form of government," not direct democracy, that 
initiatives are "the exception to the rule," and that law should be made by the legislature, not 
by the people directly, because citizens aren't generally capable of understanding the law: 
We are elected to represent the people. I found out in the . . . little short time 
here, it is very, very difficult to understand all of the intricacies, the nuances that 
go along with this legislation. You have to sit down and study it and read it and 
see how it affects the law. And when we go out to the people, it's very difficult 
for them to understand it. And they base their decisions on emotion and not on 
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facts. We have been elected to do that I think it's a benefit to the people of 
. . . Utah that only four initiatives have passed because that's the exception to the 
rule. We shouldn't be having initiatives passed every couple years. 
Id. at 263-64. S.B. 28 was passed by both houses of the legislature, and was signed into law 
by Gov. Leavitt. The law took effect on May 5, 2003. R. at 152. Two professional political 
consultants with extensive experience coordinating initiative campaigns in Utah—and whose 
depositions were noticed and taken by Defendants in this matter—agree that the new statutory 
scheme is more burdensome for citizen initiatives than the scheme Gallivan struck down, and 
that the legislature, through the passage of S.B. 28, has made it more difficult for citizens to 
initiate desired legislation. R. at 475-76, 490-92; see also infra Note 1. 
Safe Havens' Efforts to Use the Initiative Process 
After meeting with stiff resistance in the legislature throughout the 1990s, education 
groups in favor of banning guns from schools decided to avail themselves of their fundamental 
right to place the issue directly before the people. In 1999, they drafted an initiative, filed it 
with the lieutenant governor, and began to gather signatures. R. at 117-18. The education 
groups, joined in their efforts by a coalition of other interests including certain religious 
groups, attempted a grass-roots volunteer-based effort. The coalition made the decision early 
on in the process to concentrate its efforts in the rural counties, believing that the hardest part 
of the process would be to reach the 10% threshold in 20 counties. R. at 118-19.l 
1
 This belief was borne out by depositions noticed and taken by Defendants in this matter. 
Defendants deposed Richard Arnold, a political consultant who was in charge of gathering 
signatures for the 2000 English as the Official Language initiative campaign, and John 
Michael, a petition drive coordinator who was in charge of gathering signatures for the 2000 
Utah Property Protection Act initiative campaign and the 2002 RWRA initiative campaign. 
Both deponents testified that it was extremely difficult and expensive, under Utah law in effect 
in 2000 and 2002, to obtain the signatures necessary to place an initiative on the ballot. Both 
(continued...) 
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Despite many hours of volunteer labor, however, the coalition was unable to reach the 
10% threshold in a sufficient number of rural counties, and therefore did not expend a great 
deal of effort along the Wasatch Front. The coalition believes that it could have reached the 
10% statewide threshold if it had expended the resources. Still, the coalition was able to 
gather over 34,000 signatures, and, under the law then in effect, was allowed to use signatures 
for two election cycles. The coalition then readied itself for the 2002 ballot. R. at 119-20. 
This time, the coalition decided to pay, on a part-time basis, several college students to 
gather signatures in the rural counties. The coalition, true to its grass-roots, did not hire a 
signature-gathering company nor professional signature gatherers. Throughout 2001 and early 
2002, these college students, alongside numerous volunteers, attempted to gather signatures 
throughout the state. R. at 120, 267-68. Still, the coalition failed to meet the 10% threshold 
in a sufficient number of rural counties. Once again, it decided not to spend the resources 
along the Wasatch Front until it actually met the multi-county requirement, and, because it 
could not meet the multi-county requirement, it did not spend the resources along the Wasatch 
Front. Still, the coalition submitted over 41,000 verified signatures. See R. at 120, 268-69. 
In March 2003, in the wake of both the Gallivan opinion and the legislature's 2003 
amendments, the education groups, this time under the name "Safe Havens for Learning," filed 
1
 (...continued) 
testified that a successful initiative campaign requires the hiring of "hundreds of people" to 
gather signatures and complete other tasks, and requires an ultimate cash reserve of between 
$200,000 and $500,000. R. at 473,493. Both deponents stated that Utah's statutory scheme 
is among the most restrictive in the country, if not the most restrictive, id. at 476, 495, and 
both stated that, although they have not yet attempted to qualify an initiative under Utah's new 
statutory scheme, in their opinion the new scheme was more difficult for initiative sponsors, 
id. at 475-76,490-92. Both testified that it was virtually impossible, under Utah's system, for 
an all-volunteer initiative campaign to succeed. Id. at 474, 493-94. 
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a new initiative with the office of the lieutenant governor. Safe Havens filed on March 21, 
2003, before S.B. 28 took effect, in hopes of qualifying for the ballot under the post- Gallivan 
framework. See R. at 121, 270-71. Soon after filing its application to circulate a petition, 
however, Safe Havens was informed by Utah elections officials that it would be required to 
comply with the new requirements of S.B. 28. See R. at 272. 
Safe Havens disagreed with this position, because its initiative was filed and approved 
before the new law took effect, and therefore filed this lawsuit on April 30, 2003. R. at 1. 
Soon after the complaint was filed, Lt. Governor Walker sent a second letter to Safe Havens, 
informing them that, contrary to the earlier statement, two of the new provisions (the Public 
Meetings Requirement and the Same-or-Similar Ban) would not be applied to Safe Havens' 
petition, but that the balance of the new law would be applied retroactively. R. at 322. 
After briefing on the motion to dismiss and the motions for summary judgment, the 
district court determined that there was no justiciable controversy with respect to the Public 
Meetings Requirement and the Same-or-Similar Ban because Defendants had decided not to 
apply those provisions to Safe Havens' initiative. In addition, the district court determined that 
the other three challenged provisions (the Senate District Requirement, the One-Year 
Requirement, and the Signature Removal Provisions) were constitutional. This appeal ensued. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First, the district court erred by refusing to declare that the 2003 amendments to the 
Election Code can only be applied prospectively. Nothing in the new law states that it is to 
be applied retroactively, and statutes are presumed prospective in the absence of contrary 
legislative instruction. A ruling in favor of Safe Havens on this point would moot four of the 
five constitutional challenges. 
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Second, the district court erred in granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
(Justiciability). The district court held that there is no justiciable controversy with regard to 
two of Safe Havens' constitutional challenges, because Defendants' current position is that 
they do not intend to apply the Public Meetings Requirement or the Same-or-Similar Ban to 
Safe Havens' initiative. The district court erred, however, because there is a substantial 
likelihood that an actual controversy will develop between these parties on these issues, and 
therefore under this Court's precedent there is a justiciable controversy. 
Third, the district court erred in holding the challenged provisions constitutional. All 
five of the challenged provisions violate the Utah and/or the U.S. Constitutions. In Gallivan, 
this Court declared that the citizens' right to initiate legislation is a fundamental right that 
cannot be unduly burdened. Despite this pronouncement, the legislature has passed a new law 
that contains certain provisions that unduly burden the right to initiate legislation. In addition, 
the challenged provisions also violate initiative sponsors' free speech rights. 
Finally, if this Court strikes down some or all of the challenged provisions, the final 
issue to be decided concerns severability. Four of the five challenged provisions are clearly 
severable from the remainder of the statute; the legislature's intent regarding the Senate 
District Requirement is also clear from specific statutory language. This Court can follow the 
legislature's severability clause and strike all five of the challenged provisions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS (JUSTICIABILITY) AND IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT 
THE 2003 AMENDMENTS ARE PROSPECTIVE 
Safe Havens filed its latest initiative—entitled "Safe Havens for Learning"—on March 
21,2003, well before S.B. 28's May 2003 effective date. Under retroactivity rules, a party is 
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entitled to take advantage of the law at the time it files its action. Therefore, Safe Havens 
should be held to the statutory scheme in effect at the time it filed its initiative application. 
A. Retroactivity 
"Amendments to statutes are prospective only unless expressly made retroactive." 
State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993); see also In re Disconnection of Certain 
Territory, 668 P.2d 544, 549 (Utah 1983) ("[t]he well-established general rule is that statutes 
not expressly retroactive should only be applied prospectively"). The Utah Code is explicit 
on this point, stating that "[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3. S.B. 28 does not provide for retroactive effect. 
Parties are entitled to "have [their] rights determined on the basis of the law as it existed 
at the time of the occurrence." Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Common, 520 P.2d 208, 210 
(Utah 1974): see also Carlucci v. Utah State Indus. Comm'n. 725 P.2d 1335,1337 (Utah 1986) 
(stating that "[t]he general rule is that the law establishing substantive rights and liabilities 
when a cause of action arises, and not a subsequently enacted statute, governs the resolution 
of the dispute"). Accordingly, Safe Havens should be allowed to proceed with qualifying its 
initiative for the ballot under the statutory scheme in effect in March 2003. 
Ignoring this precedent, Defendants take the position that there are two, not one, dates 
on which government action must be taken with respect to citizen initiatives—one date on 
which the government must decide whether to approve the petition for circulation, and one 
date on which the government must decide whether to certify the petition for the general 
election ballot. Defendants' position is that, if the law changes between those two dates, those 
portions of the new law that concern the final certification (rather than the initial approval) of 
a citizen initiative can be applied retroactively to the initiative petition. 
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In this case, the law at the time Safe Havens' application was approved for circulation 
did not contain the Public Meetings Requirement or a Same-or-Similar Ban, so Defendants 
maintain that those two provisions of the new law do not apply to Safe Havens' petition. 
However, because the law at the time Safe Havens will submit its signatures for final 
certification will contain a Senate District Requirement and a One-Year Requirement, 
Defendants maintain that those provisions are applicable to Safe Havens' petition. Defendants 
have since explained, in legal briefing before the district court, that this opinion is based on 
Owens v. Hunt, 882 P.2d 660,661 (Utah 1994), a case whose narrow holding is that municipal 
initiative sponsors' "entitlement or right to an initiative election did not accrue until the 
initiative petition containing a proper number of certified signatures was filed." Id. (emphasis 
added). Defendants read far too much into the brief Owens opinion. 
In Owens, proponents of a municipal initiative (proposed only for the city of St. 
George) filed an initiative application with the city recorder on April 6, 1994. At that time, 
then-existing law "arguably permitted the submission of the [municipal] initiative to voters at 
the next county-wide election," which was to occur in November 1994. Id. In the 1994 
session, however, the legislature amended the statute to provide that municipal initiatives may 
only be placed on the ballot in municipal elections, the next one of which was to occur in 
November 1995. Id. The statutory amendment did not take effect until May 2,1994, after the 
municipal initiative had been filed. Id. The initiative sponsors argued that they should be able 
to avail themselves of the law in effect at the time their initiative was filed. On appeal, this 
Court disagreed. ]d. 
In Owens, however, the statutory amendment had nothing at all to do with the 
signature-gathering and initiative-qualifying process; rather, it had solely to do with the date 
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on which the initiative would eventually be placed on the ballot. The sponsors of the St. 
George initiative were not subject to two separate statutory schemes regarding the particular 
requirements of gathering signatures and placing an initiative on the ballot. Under both the 
pre-1994 and post-1994 statutory schemes, the mechanism for placing the initiative on the 
ballot was the same; the only issue concerned when the measure would appear on the ballot. 
In this case, by contrast, the 2003 amendments have everything to do with the 
mechanism for gathering signatures. At the time Safe Havens filed its initiative application, 
it was not necessary to gather signatures in 26 of 29 state Senate districts—under the law as 
articulated after Gallivan, sponsors needed to reach a 10% threshold statewide, but did not 
have to reach that threshold in a certain number of counties or Senate districts.2 In this case, 
but not in Owens, the legislature changed the signature-gathering rules in mid-stream. 
In other words, Owens does not concern the right to certainty regarding the process 
under which the sponsor is to obtain the requisite number of verified signatures; Owens 
concerns only the entitlement to an election once the process has been met. Moreover, the 
policy concerns at issue here—allowing the citizens of Utah to exercise their initiative right 
with some certainty that new requirements will not be imposed upon them in mid-
stream—were not the policies implicated in Owens. Indeed, if Defendants are correct, 
Owens allows the legislature to make Utahns the modern Sisyphus, forever rolling a rock up 
a hill just to have it slide back down. The legislature could ensure that any given initiative 
would never reach the ballot simply by changing the qualification requirements while 
2
 In addition, under the law in effect in March 2003, sponsors were not limited to a one-
year time window in which to collect signatures; rather, sponsors had two full election cycles 
to gather and submit signatures before a re-filing became necessary. 
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signatures are being gathered. Alternatively, the lieutenant governor could arbitrarily choose 
which procedural mechanisms apply retroactively, and could act as a gatekeeper in situations 
where the legislature does not fully articulate its intent. 
In any event, Owens must be re-examined in light of this Court's ruling in Gallivan. 
In Gallivan, as discussed above, this Court declared that the right of Utahns to initiate desired 
legislation was a fundamental right than may not be unduly burdened. See Gallivan. 2002 UT 
89,1J24, 54 P.3d 1069. Surely a scheme under which the Utah legislature would be free to 
change the rules on initiative sponsors in mid-stream, during the signature gathering process, 
is an undue burden on the fundamental right. In order to be able to fully exercise their 
fundamental right to initiate legislation, Utahns must have certainty when beginning the 
signature gathering process that the rules will not materially change during the process.3 
For these reasons, Owens does not prevent this Court from determining that Safe 
Havens is required to comply only with the requirements in effect on the date it filed its 
initiative application, and is not required to comply with the 2003 legislative amendments.4 
B. Justiciability 
Defendants maintain, and the district court agreed, that there is no justiciable 
controversy regarding the Public Meetings Requirement and the Same-or-Similar Ban, because 
3
 Indeed, Safe Havens submits that Owens was wrongly decided, given this Court's 
retroactivity jurisprudence. Initiative proponents, no less than litigants, are entitled to certainty 
regarding the rules of the process, and are entitled to uhave [their] rights determined on the 
basis of the law as it existed at the time of the occurrence," Okland Constr., 520 P.2d at 210, 
which by rights should be the date on which the application was filed. 
4
 If this Court determines that the 2003 amendments are not retroactive, all but one of Safe 
Havens' constitutional challenges will be mooted. The one that will remain justiciable is Safe 
Havens' constitutional challenge to the Signature Removal Provisions, because the Signature 
Removal Provisions stem from the old statute, and not from the 2003 amendments. 
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Defendants are not applying those requirements to Safe Havens. This position is erroneous. 
As an initial matter, Utah courts are not constrained by any "case or controversy" 
requirement. "Unlike the federal system, the judicial power of the state of Utah is not 
constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III of the United States Constitution 
requiring 'cases' or 'controversies,' since no similar requirement exists in the Utah 
Constitution." Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145,1149 (Utah 1983). Rather, justiciability issues 
are governed by Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act, which "is to be liberally construed and 
administered" so that litigants may be afforded "relief from uncertainty and insecurity with 
respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-12. This Court 
"read[s] this section as allowing for a wide interpretation of what constitutes a 'justiciable 
controversy.'" Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 1999 UT 73, f 12, 
985 P.2d 899 (emphasis added); see Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P.2d 119, 121 
(Utah 1977) ("the court will be indulgent in entertaining actions brought to achieve [the 
purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act, especially] where there is a substantial public 
interest to be served by the settlement of such an issue"). 
A justiciable controversy exists "if: (i) the parties are adverse; (ii) the party seeking 
relief has or asserts a bona fide claim; and (iii) the issues are ripe for adjudication where it 
appears 'there is an actual controversy, or that there is a substantial likelihood that one will 
develop so that the adjudication will serve a useful purpose in resolving or avoiding 
controversy or possible litigation.'" Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In this case, there is no real dispute regarding the first two elements of the test—the 
parties are adverse, and Safe Havens asserts a bona fide (and not a sham or manufactured) 
claim against Defendants. Defendants maintain, however, that there is not a "substantial 
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likelihood" that an actual controversy will develop regarding the Public Meetings Requirement 
and the Same-or-Similar Requirement. 
Contrary to Defendants' argument, there is at least a "substantial likelihood" that an 
actual controversy will develop, and the adjudication of the claims will serve a useful purpose 
in avoiding future litigation. Safe Havens is committed to the cause of placing its initiative 
on the ballot. As evidenced by its several attempts, if it fails this time, it will try again. If it 
tries again, it will be required to comply with the Public Meetings Requirement and the Same-
or-Similar Ban. These matters will eventually be adjudicated, and it would be a poor use of 
judicial and litigant resources to force these same litigants to come back later. The parties are 
already here, and Safe Havens has already briefed the issues for the Court. This Court can, 
and should, adjudicate all of the claims presented by Safe Havens in this matter. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CHALLENGED 
PROVISIONS OF UTAH'S INITIATIVE STATUTE DO NOT VIOLATE THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
The district court also erred by refusing to grant Safe Havens' Motion for Summary 
Judgment regarding the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Election Code. 
The district court held that the three challenged provisions currently being applied to Safe 
Havens (the Senate District Requirement, the One Year Requirement, and the Signature 
Removal Provisions) were constitutional, and granted Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment. This ruling was error, because all five of the challenged provisions violate Article 
VI, section 1, and Article I, sections 24 and 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
A. Defendants Bear the Burden of Proving That the Challenged Provisions 
Are Constitutional 
As an initial matter, because the interests at stake are specifically protected by the Utah 
603739v2 -20-
Constitution, the presumption of validity that normally attaches to legislative acts does not 
attach to the challenged provisions. In cases involving statutes which implicate specific 
constitutional rights, this Court has stated that 
[b]ecause the interests at stake are specifically protected by the constitution, the 
presumption of validity that normally attaches to legislative action must be 
reversed once it is shown that the enactment under scrutiny does, in fact, 
infringe upon the interests in article I, section 11. The burden is then upon the 
proponents of the legislation's validity to demonstrate that its restrictions on 
those rights are carefully drawn and supported by weighty considerations. 
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572,582 n. 15 (Utah 1993) (quoting Condemarin v. University Hosp., 
775 P.2d 348, 368 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J, concurring)); see also Wood v. University of 
Utah Med. Or., 2002 UT 134, [^46, 67 P.3d 436 (a shifting majority of Justices Durham, 
Russon, and Howe reaffirming the reversal of the presumption of validity in cases involving 
statutes implicating specific constitutional rights); Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating that because the challenged statute impacts a constitutional right, 
"the usual presumption of validity does not control our review of the statute"). This line of 
cases is not limited to the Article I, section 11 context—in Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y of 
Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), this Court stated that "the proponent of legislation infringing" 
a fundamental right must show that the legislation is constitutional. Id. at 206. 
In Gallivan, this Court declared that "[t]he reserved right and power of initiative is a 
fundamental right under article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution."5 Gallivan. 2002 UT 
Removal of the presumption of validity is particularly important in the initiative context. 
Because the Utah Constitution makes the legislative power of the people and the legislature 
coequal, any regulation of the initiative right automatically changes the balance of law-making 
power between the people and their representatives. In this zero-sum scenario, it is especially 
appropriate for the restriction's proponents to bear the responsibility of proving the need for 
any encroachment on the people's legislative power. See Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, f^59 n. 11 (the 
(continued...) 
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89, |^24 (citations omitted). There can be no doubt that the statutory provisions challenged 
here place restrictions upon interests "specifically protected by the constitution," and, 
therefore, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed. The burden falls to 
Defendants to demonstrate that the challenged provisions are "carefully drawn" and 
"supported by weighty considerations." Defendants cannot meet this burden. 
B. The Challenged Provisions Violate Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution, Which Reserves to the People the Right to Initiate Legislation 
The Utah Constitution provides that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the people and 
all free governments are founded on their authority." Utah Const, art I, § 2. The people of the 
State of Utah reserved and guaranteed to themselves the right to create law by initiative. See 
Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ^|23. In Article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, the people 
delegated a portion of their law-making power to the legislature, but reserved to themselves 
a right to "initiate any desired legislation." In Gallivan, this Court declared that the citizens' 
right to initiate legislation "is a fundamental right under article VI, section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution." Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ]f24 (citations omitted). This Court emphasized that 
"[t]he power of the legislature and the power of the people to legislate through initiative and 
referenda are coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and share equal dignity." Id. at f 23. 
Because the initiative right is fundamental, and coequal with the legislature's own 
power to make law, the legislature "can and is required to enact legislation that implements 
and enables the exercise of the people's right to initiative." Id. at ^ 27 (emphasis added). The 
5
 (...continued) 
initiative process "has a different character in our constitutional system than the direct 
legislative process in that the direct initiative process may be considered a constitutional check 
on the representative legislature if it fails to enact widely supported legislation"). 
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legislature may not and must not "pass laws that unduly burden or diminish the people's right 
to initiate legislation." Id. (emphasis added); accord Owens, 882 P.2d at 661 (legislature can-
not pass laws that impose an "unreasonable restraint on the rights of the electorate" to legislate 
through initiative). This Court has reaffirmed its duty to defend "the people's right to directly 
legislate through initiative . . . against encroachment." Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, at ]f27. 
In GalHvan, the Court struck down the requirement that proponents gather signatures 
in 20 of Utah's 29 counties equal to 10% of the persons who voted in each county in the last 
gubernatorial election (the "multi-county requirement"). Id. at [^64. The Court found, inter 
alia, that the multi-county requirement imposed an impermissible burden on the initiative 
right. Id. at ff49-50, 53-54, 62 ("the multi-county signature requirement unduly hinders the 
ability to get initiatives on the ballot"). However, the Court also found that the multi-county 
requirement was infirm because it weighted rural signatures more heavily that than urban 
signatures, presenting a problem under the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah 
Constitution. Gallivant, 2002 UT 89, [^45. 
In this case, the challenged provisions do not create impermissible or suspect 
classifications among Utah citizens, and therefore do not present the same uniform operation 
of laws issue as the provisions challenged in Gallivan. Here, by contrast, the legislature has 
enacted statutory provisions that make it much more difficult for all Utahns to place initiatives 
on the ballot. The first issue for this Court is which constitutional test governs this situation. 
Because this case presents the first post-Gallivan constitutional challenge brought 
directly under Article VI, section 1, there is little guiding precedent regarding the appropriate 
constitutional test to be applied. Safe Havens suggests two different tests, and maintains that 
the challenged provisions are unconstitutional under either. 
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1. The challenged provisions are unconstitutional under an "undue 
burden/enabling" test. 
Safe Havens first suggests a test drawn from the language in Paragraph 28 ofGallivan, 
which Safe Havens herein refers to as the "undue burden/enabling" test. The essential 
question is whether the challenged restrictions comport with this Court's instruction that "the 
legislature can and is required to enact legislation that implements and enables the exercise of 
the people's right to initiative," and does not "unduly burden or diminish the people's right to 
initiate legislation." See Gallivan. 2002 UT 89, f28. The legislation passes the test if it 
facilitates and enables the initiative right, but fails the test if it imposes undue burdens on the 
initiative right, or was intended simply to make the process harder for Utah citizens.6 Each of 
the challenged provisions fails under this test, because each one imposes undue burdens on the 
initiative right, and none enables or facilitates the right. 
The Public Meetings Requirement imposes severe restrictions upon initiative-related 
speech and expression in Utah. This requirement substantially and without real justification 
increases the costs of qualifying an initiative for the ballot,7 making it accordingly less likely 
6
 The "undue burden/enabling" test suggested by Gallivan's text is akin to the "undue 
burden" test applied by federal courts in the abortion context. In Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey. 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the right of a woman to 
abort an unviable fetus cannot be unduly burdened, and that a statute imposes an undue burden 
if it has "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion of a nonviable fetus." See id. (emphasis added) (as discussed by this Court in 
Wood. 2002 UT 134, [^17, 67 P.3d 436). As the following discussion demonstrates, the 
challenged provisions of Utah's Election Code have the purpose and the effect of placing 
substantial obstacles in the path of Utahns who seek to place an initiative before the people, 
and therefore place an undue burden on the fundamental right of Utah citizens to initiate 
desired legislation. 
7
 For example, this requirement forces sponsors to spend several weeks, at the beginning 
of the initiative campaign, traveling throughout the state holding meetings, and thereby 
(continued...) 
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that citizens will begin the effort of attempting to qualify an initiative for the ballot. 
The Senate District Requirement imposes a severe burden on the fundamental right of 
Utahns to initiate legislation. As discussed more fully below, to pass a statute through the 
Utah Senate, proponents need secure the votes of only 15 Senators—indeed, placing a 
constitutional amendment before the electorate requires the votes of only 20 Senators.8 Yet, 
to place an initiative on the ballot, sponsors must reach a 10% threshold in 26 Senate districts. 
The burdens imposed by the Senate District Requirement are magnified when viewed 
in conjunction with the Signature Removal Provisions, which the 2003 Legislature left 
untouched from the previous statute. Those provisions allow initiative opponents unfettered 
access to petition signers during the month of June (after sponsors are prohibited from 
submitting additional replacement signatures), during which time signers may remove their 
names from the petition. Those provisions, coupled with the Senate District Requirement, 
allow initiative opponents to focus on one or two (or at most, four) Senate districts in which 
sponsors have cleared the 10% hurdle by the narrowest margin. By selecting the right Senate 
districts, initiative opponents can, in one month and with far fewer resources, undo all of the 
sponsors' hard work and tens of thousands of signatures by persuading several hundred 
7
 (...continued) 
substantially increasing the number of person-hours required to qualify an initiative for the 
ballot. Sponsors must take time off from their jobs for these days and weeks to attend these 
meetings. Sponsors must rent public meeting halls in seven cities around the state. Sponsors 
must hire stenographers, videographers, or other transcription services to record and document 
the meetings. Sponsors must advertise the meetings in local newspapers, but must also notify 
legislators and other local elected officials individually and specifically, in a manner separate 
from the notice provided to the general population. 
8
 In essence S.B. 28 operates as a de facto amendment of the Utah Constitution. Because 
S.B. 28 makes it difficult, if not impossible, for most Utahns to exercise their law-making 
power, the statute effectively edits the initiative right out of the Constitution. 
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strategically-placed signers to remove their names from the petition. 
The Same-or-Similar Ban imposes undue burdens on the initiative right, and amounts 
to an outright ban on certain initiatives merely because identical or similar initiatives have 
been suggested in the past. The Utah statute takes certain subjects, which are usually the more 
hotly-debated subjects in the state, and imposes an outright ban on those subjects for two 
years, cutting sponsors off before they even are able to begin speaking about the subject.9 
Finally, the One-Year Requirement imposes a severe burden on initiative sponsors, 
especially sponsors of all-volunteer initiative campaigns. Under the new provision, initiative 
sponsors have only one year to gather the required number of signatures, and the penalty is 
high if they fall short—sponsors who spend a whole year gathering signatures and come up 
just short will be required to throw all of their signatures out, and start from scratch. 
The restrictions imposed by the new statute are even more burdensome than the 
restrictions imposed by the pre-Gallivan statutory scheme, which included the unconstitutional 
multi-county requirement. R. at 475-76,490-92 (testimony of Mr. Arnold and Mr. Michael). 
There can be little doubt that the challenged provisions are intended to doom, rather 
than facilitate, the creation of law by initiative.10 Legislative history confirms any suspicion 
9
 This provision will also encourage the filing of sham initiatives, whereby initiative 
opponents, in an effort to pre-empt legitimate citizen initiatives, will file initiatives on a certain 
topic, make only token efforts to gather signatures, and submit those signatures. Such a 
maneuver could effectively keep certain initiatives off the ballot for a two-year period. 
10
 In addition to placing undue burdens on initiative sponsors, the Senate District 
Requirement will also place additional burdens on the county clerks and on the lieutenant 
governor. Under the new scheme, the county clerks will be required to verify that each 
petition signer resides in a particular Senate district. The burdens on the county clerks in the 
urbanized Wasatch Front counties, where each county contains multiple Senate districts, will 
be markedly increased. In addition, it may be literally impossible for the lieutenant 
governor's office to come up with the magic number of required signatures in each Senate 
(continued...) 
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concerning the legislature's motivation for placing draconian restraints on the process. See 
R. at 190,192,196,263-64 (legislative floor debates in which legislators spoke openly about 
their intention to make it more difficult to place an initiative on the ballot); id. at 227-28,231 -
32, 235, 237, 247-48, 253, 257, 259-60 (legislative floor debates in which some legislators 
warned that S.B. 28 was unduly burdening the initiative right). In light of the legislative 
history and the substance of the restrictions themselves, Defendants cannot plausibly argue 
that these amendments were designed to facilitate the initiative right. 
The challenged provisions were designed to throw stumbling blocks in the path of 
citizens who want to place issues before the voters of Utah. Under Gallivan and Article VI, 
section 1 of the Utah Constitution, these restrictions cannot stand as a matter of law. 
2. The challenged provisions are unconstitutional under the 
"heightened scrutiny standard" found in this Court's fundamental 
rights jurisprudence. 
The next alternative test suggested by Safe Havens is drawn from this Court's 
jurisprudence in other "fundamental rights" cases, most notably cases arising under the 
uniform operation of laws clause (Article I, section 24) and the state due process clause 
(Article I, section 7). In these cases, this Court has applied heightened scrutiny to provisions 
that impact "fundamental rights," upholding such provisions only if they actually and 
substantially further a legitimate legislative objective and are reasonably necessary to further 
that objective. The challenged provisions are unconstitutional under this test. 
(...continued) 
district, given the massive redistricting that has occurred since the 2000 general election. The 
statute requires that the lieutenant governor provide, "to any interested person," the "total of 
all votes cast in [each Utah State Senate district] for all candidates for governor." See Utah 
Code Ann. § 20A-7-201(3)(b). This number may literally be un-ascertainable, imposing a 
burden upon the chief election officer that is severe and undue. 
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In the uniform operation of laws context, this Court has stated that legislation is 
unconstitutional if it "infringes a fundamental or critical right." Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 
2002 UT 42, |23, 48 P.3d 941 (citations omitted); accord Gallivan. 2002 UT 89, f l l ; Rvan 
v. Gold Cross Services. 903 P.2d 423, 525 (Utah 1995). If the law impacts a fundamental or 
critical right, the law is constitutional under the uniform operation of laws provision only if 
it: "(1) is reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative 
objective, and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, and (3) 
is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal." Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ^42.n 
In the due process context, this Court applies a similar but slightly different test. This 
Court has long since identified certain rights, including parental rights, as "'fundamental' for 
purposes of due process," see Wells, 681 P.2d at 206, and legislation that infringes 
fundamental rights is constitutional only if the proponent of that legislation can "show (1) a 
compelling state interest in the result to be achieved and (2) that the means adopted are 
'narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory purpose.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
The right to initiate legislation is a fundamental right under the Utah Constitution. See 
Gallivan. 2002 UT 89,1flj25, 27. Thus, legislative enactments that impact the right to initiate 
legislation are to be considered under the heightened scrutiny standard and pass muster only 
if they are reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative purpose. None of the 
11
 Safe Havens has brought a direct challenge in this case under the uniform operation of 
laws clause, even though no discriminatory classification is at issue here, because much of this 
Court's jurisprudence states that a uniform operations challenge may be brought when a 
fundamental right is impacted. R. at 17 (complaint); R. at 76-87 (briefing on the issue below). 
Safe Havens recognizes that this concept may appear in the Article I, section 24 case law 
because Utah's uniform operations of law clause is commonly characterized as the Utah 
analogue to the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Safe Havens further recognizes that 
the fundamental rights portion of the Article I, section 24 case law might also be viewed as a 
substantive due process challenge under Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
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challenged provisions are constitutional under either test. 
a. There is no legitimate legislative purpose underlying the 
challenged provisions. 
Defendants bear the burden of showing that there are legitimate legislative purposes 
underlying the challenged provisions.12 Defendants will be unable to meet this burden as a 
matter of law because the justifications they can offer in defense of the restrictions will be 
either facially pretextual or already rejected by this Court. 
The Senate District Requirement and the Public Meetings Requirement. The floor 
debates in the 2003 Legislature reveal that the legislature's apparent purpose in enacting the 
Senate District Requirement and Public Meetings Requirement was to make Utahns living 
outside the Wasatch Front gatekeepers for the initiative process.13 See R. at 234, 263 
(comments of Sen. Dmitrich, Rep. Buttars, and Rep. Noel). From these comments, it is clear 
that the Legislature wanted the Senate District Requirement and Public Meetings Requirement 
to ensure that any issue that qualifies for the ballot has support in areas of Utah outside the 
Wasatch Front. This legislative purpose is invalid for several reasons. 
12
 The first factor from the uniform operation of laws test—whether the restrictions are 
"reasonable"—has, to Safe Havens' knowledge, never been definitively applied or explained 
by this Court in the context of heightened scrutiny. The requirement appears to have been 
taken from Justice Stewart's concurrence in Condemarin, where he stated that "[t]he 
determination of reasonableness must take into account the extent to which the constitutional 
right is . . . diminished and the extent to which the burden imposed actually furthers the 
legislative goals, as well as the importance of those goals." Lee, 867 P.2d at 582 (quoting 
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 373 (Stewart, J. concurring)). To some degree, this requirement 
collapses into the other two prongs of the Lee test; in fact, the Lee court did not separately 
analyze the reasonableness of the challenged statute. 
13
 Defendants will likely argue that the Public Meetings Requirement is also justified by 
the legislative purpose of promoting an informed electorate. Safe Havens agrees that this may 
be a legitimate aim, but, for the reasons discussed below, the Public Meetings Requirement 
actually thwarts that purpose and is therefore not reasonably necessary and is unconstitutional. 
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This argument "puts the cart before the horse by giving the minority a preemptive 
weapon against the perceived potential infringement of the minority's rights from the 
majority's attempted resort to the initiative process." Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ^[61. The 
Gallivan court further reasoned that putting the majority of Utahns' ability to use the initiative 
process in the hands of a minority "gives the minority control of the initiative power" and 
"turns our system of majority rule on its head." Id. This governmental purpose runs counter 
to the premise that "majority rule is the foundation[] of both of the constitutionally mandated 
mechanisms for enacting legislation." Id. at ^ |60.14 
Using the Senate District Requirement to avoid initiatives emanating from the Wasatch 
Front is illegitimate for another reason: it erodes the people's legislative power and enhances 
the legislative power the people granted to the legislature. "The power of the legislature and 
the power of the people to legislate through initiative and referenda are coequal, coextensive, 
and concurrent and share 'equal dignity.'" Id. at TJ23 (citations omitted). Allowing the 
legislature to make it harder to pass law by initiative than it is to pass law by legislation would 
permit the legislative branch to "confiscate to itself the bulk of, if not all, legislative power," 
and render "itself the only legislative game in town." Id. at ^[51. 
This argument comes into clearer focus when one takes into account that to make law, 
the legislature need only secure 15 votes in the Senate and 38 votes in the House. This means 
that the 11 Senators representing Salt Lake County, together with any four of the ten Senators 
representing Utah, Davis, and Weber Counties, could pass most legislation. Indeed, to place 
14
 It bears noting that, while not voiced by the legislature, this concern cuts both for and 
against those living outside the Wasatch Front. With the Senate District Requirement in place, 
citizens living outside the Wasatch Front cannot place initiatives on the ballot without securing 
the consent of voters living in Senate Districts located in Salt Lake County. 
603739v2 -30-
a constitutional amendment before the electorate, only 20 of Utah's 29 Senators (and two-
thirds of the members of the House) need to lend their support. This means that the 11 Salt 
Lake County Senators, joined by nine of the ten Senators from Utah, Davis, and Weber 
counties, could place a constitutional amendment before the electorate. Thus, it requires 
broader support, measured in terms of Senate districts, for Utah citizens to place an initiative 
before the electorate than it does to either (a) pass a law through the legislature or (b) place a 
constitutional amendment before the electorate. The Senate District Requirement dilutes the 
people's legislative power, reserved unto themselves in the Utah Constitution, to initiate 
legislation. Diluting the people's legislative power is not a legitimate legislative purpose. 
Indeed, this Court emphasized that "[countering the possibility of localized legislation 
is not a legitimate legislative purpose" and that "[t]he legislature itself does not operate under 
the requirement that legislation enacted through its processes and procedures must avoid 
'localized' legislation that potentially favors one region or county of the state." Gallivan. 2002 
UT 89, Tf57. Because the initiative right is "coequal" with the legislature's own power to pass 
laws, creating barriers to the exercise of the initiative right that do not exist for the legislature 
cannot be a legitimate legislative purpose. In short, the Public Meetings Requirement and the 
Senate District Requirement do not further any legitimate legislative purpose. 
The Signature Removal Provisions. Examination of the legislative debates does not 
appear to yield any definitive explanation of the legislature's purposes behind its failure to 
address the signature removal provisions. To be clear, Safe Havens does not challenge the 
Legislature's general inclusion of a signature removal provision; indeed, this Court has long 
ago stated that initiative petition signers have a "fundamental r ight . . . to withdraw from a 
petition at any time before the petition has been acted upon." See Halgren v. Welling. 63 P.2d 
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550, 557 (Utah 1936) (emphasis added). 
Safe Havens does, however, challenge the timing of the current signature removal 
provisions, which allow signers to remove their signatures from petitions up to July 1, when 
the petitions are submitted to the lieutenant governor. The current scheme, which requires 
sponsors to submit all signatures to the county clerks no later than June 1 (at which time the 
signatures, including the signers' names and addresses, become public information), allows 
initiative opponents at least one month of unfettered access to initiative signers,15 during which 
time initiative sponsors are barred from submitting additional replacement signatures. 
Because of the timing of the Signature Removal Provisions, sponsors must plan to 
gather more signatures than are required by the initiative law, so that they can weather the 
removal process. When coupled with the Senate District Requirement, the Signature Removal 
Provisions become even more vexing because they allow opponents to target Senate districts 
with the fewest signatures and pick off enough signers to "de-qualify" that district. 
There does not appear to be any valid legislative purpose behind the timing of the 
Signature Removal Provisions. It would seem to be just as effective, and completely in line 
with Halgren, to institute a scheme in which signers could remove their names until the 
petitions begin to be "acted upon" by the county clerks. Safe Havens can only assume that this 
framework is designed to tilt the playing field in favor of initiative opponents and to make it 
harder to qualify initiatives for the ballot. The Gallivan Court made clear that this is not a 
legitimate legislative purpose. Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ^ J51 (the "purpose of ensuring that 'init-
15
 Enactment of the new One-Year Requirement means that opponents will, in many cases, 
have much longer than one month to conduct precision removal campaigns. Sponsors will be 
compelled by the One-Year Requirement to submit signatures well in advance of June 1, 
giving opponents potentially several months to contact petition signers. 
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iatives are not so easy to get on the ballot"' "clearly is not a legitimate legislative purpose"). 
The Same-or'-Similar Ban. The Legislature's purpose in enacting the Same-or-Similar 
Ban was set forth by the bill's sponsor, Sen. Hickman, who bluntly stated as follows: 
The reason for that was because we, on occasion, have had petitions and initia-
tives developed on a local level and fluoridation is a classic example of that, 
where it just keeps coming back and coming back and coming back. So, we 
thought that from the—until there was a change in state policy or attitude by the 
voters that a four-year period of time was reasonable. The Attorney General has 
asked us to maybe shorten that, and so we have reduced it to a two-year period. 
R. at 223 (emphasis added). Thus, the Legislature's purpose in enacting the two-year ban was 
to prevent certain initiatives from "coming back and coming back and coming back." 
As a practical matter, the initiatives that are continually filed and circulated, year in and 
year out, are often the ones devoted to issues around which the most robust public debate 
swirls—term limits, fluoridation, guns in schools, radioactive waste, etc. It hardly needs to 
be argued that the Legislature's stated purpose—a blatant attempt to impose an outright ban 
on certain initiatives, which are often the most hotly-debated ones—is not legitimate. 
The One-Year Requirement. Examination of the legislative history does not yield any 
information regarding the legislature's purpose in repealing the provision that, formerly, had 
allowed sponsors two election cycles to qualify their initiative for the ballot, and shortening 
the signature collection period to one year. In any event, Defendants will be hard pressed to 
articulate any legitimate legislative purpose supporting the amendments. 
Safe Havens has taxed its creative powers to divine what justifications Defendants 
could propose to justify these restrictions.16 The State's inability to justify these new burdens 
16
 It is worthy of note that, before the district court, Defendants did not even attempt to 
justify any of the challenged provisions (other than the Senate District Requirement) as 
furthering any legitimate governmental objective. Specifically, no argument was even 
(continued...) 
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will lead inexorably to the conclusion that the legislature put these hurdles in the law solely 
to make it more difficult to qualify initiatives for the ballot. The Gallivan court has already 
opined that the legislature has no legitimate interest in making it harder to place initiatives on 
the ballot. Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, [^51 (the "purpose of ensuring that 'initiatives are not so 
easy to get on the ballot'" "clearly is not a legitimate legislative purpose"). 
Simply stated, with the possible exception of the purpose of promoting an informed 
electorate, the challenged provisions are not justified by legitimate governmental interests. 
b. Even if legitimate governmental interests existed, the challenged 
provisions do not actually and substantially further those 
interests. 
To pass muster under heightened scrutiny, it is not enough that Defendants articulate 
a legitimate legislative interest. Defendants must also demonstrate that the legislation "has 
more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective, and, in fact, actually and 
substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose." Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, TJ42. 
As noted above, Safe Havens sincerely doubts that Defendants can advance any 
legitimate goal for any of the challenged provisions. For this reason, they cannot meet their 
burden of showing that those provisions actually and substantially further any legitimate 
legislative end. Even assuming, arguendo, that promoting statewide geographic support for 
initiatives, or promoting a better-informed electorate, were legitimate legislative purposes for 
some of the restrictions, the amendments do not actually further those legislative ends. 
The Asserted Purpose of Achieving Statewide Support: The Gallivan Court examined 
this proposition at length with respect to the multi-county requirement (and, as noted above, 
16
 (...continued) 
mounted that the Public Meetings Requirement, the Signature Removal Provisions, the One-
Year Requirement, or the Same-or-Similar Ban furthered any legitimate governmental aim. 
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stated emphatically that countering localized legislation was not a legitimate governmental 
purpose, Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, at 1J57). Because the logic Gallivan employed applies with 
equal force in this context, it bears quoting the entire analysis: 
In addition, the multi-county signature requirement does not actually and 
substantially further the legislative purpose of ensuring statewide support, that 
is, broadly distributed geographic support, or of promoting initiatives regarding 
issues of statewide interest. The multi-county signature requirement has the 
opposite effect. By giving an effective veto to the rural minority over the urban 
majority, initiatives that enjoy statewide support from the majority of the 
population and therefore focus on issues of at least numerical statewide concern 
are prevented from qualifying for the ballot. In this respect, the multi-county 
signature requirement thwarts the placement on the ballot of widely supported 
initiatives. Effectively, only initiatives of rural concern and with rural support 
get placed on the ballot, thus defeating the use of the initiative process and 
purpose of statewide support. Therefore, the multi-county signature 
requirement with regard to this purpose does not pass the Lee test because it 
does not actually and substantially further the stated legislative purpose of 
ensuring statewide support. 
Gallivan. 2002 UT 89, f 50. Stated differently, the Gallivan court concluded that the multi-
county requirement did not actually and substantially ensure statewide support for initiatives 
because it had the effect of keeping issues off the ballot that were of a concern to a numerical 
majority of Utahns statewide. That rationale applies here as well. The Senate District 
Requirement ensures that an initiative cannot be placed on the ballot unless it appeals to a 
number of voters outside the Wasatch Front. This means that only those issues that are of 
concern to those who live outside the Wasatch Front can be placed on the ballot. This 
decreases the number of issues that can qualify. For this reason, even assuming, arguendo, 
that mustering statewide support were a legitimate governmental purpose, the Senate District 
Requirement does not substantially further that aim. 
The Asserted Purpose of Achieving a Well-informed Electorate: Defendants may argue 
that the Public Meetings Requirement (and perhaps the Senate District Requirement as well) 
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substantially furthers the goal of promoting a well-informed electorate. This Court has 
rejected this justification. In Gallivan, this Court opined that the circulation of petitions only 
informs a small number of voters, and that "in reality, it is after the initiative is placed on the 
ballot and the campaigns for and against the initiative are underway that the electorate 
becomes informed." GalHvan, 2002 UT 89, ^62. This Court further found that a geographic 
requirement is irrelevant to this process "because the electorate becomes informed" once the 
election commences "whether [or not] the proponents of an initiative circulated the initial 
petition in and garnered signatures from" the required counties. Id. at ^ [63. 
An examination of newspaper articles on initiatives that qualify for the ballot bears out 
the Gallivan Court's reasoning. Before an initiative qualifies for the ballot (that is, during the 
signature-collecting phase), public debate on the proposed initiative is minimal. However, 
once an initiative actually qualifies for the ballot, public debate on the issues surrounding the 
proposed initiative increases dramatically. In 2002, newspaper articles regarding the 
Radioactive Waste Restrictions Act increased approximately two-fold after the measure 
qualified for the ballot. See R. at 281 -94. The RWRA may have been an anomaly, however, 
because of a great deal of pre-qualifying publicity regarding the initiative process itself. In 
2000, the increase in public debate regarding the "English as the Official Language" initiative 
subsequent to qualifying for the ballot is even more striking, with public debate appearing to 
increase by a factor of approximately ten. Id. at fflf 5-6. Public debate, and with it awareness 
of facts regarding the issues surrounding the initiative, increases greatly after the measure 
qualifies for the ballot. If the objective is truly to have a better-informed electorate, the best 
way to further this objective is to allow more initiatives to qualify for the ballot, not fewer. 
Simply stated, none of the proffered justifications, even if legitimate, are actually and 
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substantially furthered by the challenged restrictions. 
c. The challenged provisions are not reasonably necessary to 
further a legitimate goal 
Finally, the challenged restrictions are not "reasonably necessary to further a legitimate 
goal," Lee, 867 P.2d at 583, and are not "narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory 
purpose," Wells, 681 P.2d at 206. This is so for two reasons. First, as discussed above, there 
are no legitimate legislative goals underlying the restrictions. Second, even if there were, the 
restrictions are not reasonably necessary to promote those goals, because there are other less-
restrictive methods that the legislature could employ to achieve these ends. 
The legislative history makes it difficult for Defendants to credibly claim that these 
restrictions were carefully drawn. Time and again during the debates on the amendment, 
legislators expressed concerns that the restrictions were too burdensome. See R. at 227-28, 
231-32, 235, 237, 247-48, 253, 257, 259-60. Time and again the Legislature as a whole 
ignored these concerns, rejected amendments designed to address these stated concerns, and 
kept the broad restrictions in place. See R. at 190, 192, 196, 263-64. 
Thus, Defendants cannot meet their burden on any of the prongs of the heightened 
scrutiny test, and therefore the challenged provisions are unconstitutional under that test. No 
matter which test this Court ultimately selects, the challenged provisions must be struck down 
and excised from the statute books. 
C. The Challenged Provisions Violate Article I, Section 15 of the Utah 
Constitution 
The challenged provisions also violate Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution, 
which guarantees that "[n]o law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech 
or of the press." There is very little published case law interpreting this section, leading this 
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Court to conclude that the free speech provision "has never been authoritatively interpreted." 
KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1983). Moreover, there is very little history 
to help mold a proper standard to adjudicate state free speech claims. Id. (stating that "[t]he 
history of Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution is sparse"). The most substantive 
guidance from this Court is that the Utah Constitution should afford broader rights than the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Provo City Corp. v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455, 456 
n.2 (Utah 1989).17 In light of the lack of precedent, Safe Havens suggests that this Court apply 
the same heightened scrutiny framework established in this Court's uniform operation of laws 
jurisprudence to free speech challenges under the Utah Constitution. 
1. The challenged provisions fail under heightened scrutiny and are 
therefore unconstitutional. 
As described at length above, when fundamental rights are at issue, heightened scrutiny 
is appropriate. Because freedom of speech is unquestionably a fundamental right.,18 under the 
existing uniform operations test the heightened scrutiny analysis would apply automatically 
to any section 15 challenge. See supra part II.B.3. Applying the heightened scrutiny test to 
an Article I, section 15 challenge, this Court would first question whether the restrictions on 
speech are justified because they actually and substantially further a valid legislative purpose. 
17
 As discussed below, the new initiative restrictions do violate the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, because they impose severe restrictions on core political speech. See infra. 
Part III. If the restrictions fail under the U.S. Constitution, they must necessarily fail under 
Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
18
 See Utah Const., art. I, § 1 (stating that "[a]ll men have the inherent and inalienable right 
. . . to communicate freely their thoughts and expressions"); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 558 
(Utah 1988) (stating that "[fjreedom of speech is not only the hallmark of free people, but is, 
indeed, an essential attribute to the sovereignty of citizenship"); Meyer v. Grant 486 U.S. 414, 
420 (1988) (freedom of speech is uamong the fundamental personal rights and liberties which 
are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State"). 
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Lee, 867 P.2d at 583. As discussed above, the initiative restrictions will not clear this hurdle. 
This Court would next examine whether the requirements are reasonably necessary to 
further a legitimate legislative purpose. Id. The answer, for the reasons outlined above, is a 
resounding "No." Accordingly, if this Court decides to apply the fundamental rights analysis 
to challenges under Article I, section 15, the new restrictions will fail. 
2. The challenged provisions fail under the federal free speech test, and 
are therefore unconstitutional. 
If this Court chooses not to apply the fundamental rights/heightened scrutiny 
framework to Safe Havens' Article I, section 15 challenge, this Court should perhaps apply 
the federal test, articulated in more detail below. For the reasons stated below, the challenged 
provisions do not pass muster under the federal test. 
For all of these reasons, the challenged portions of Utah's initiative statute are 
unconstitutional under Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CHALLENGED 
PROVISIONS OF UTAH'S INITIATIVE STATUTE DO NOT VIOLATE THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 
In addition to violating the Utah Constitution, the challenged provisions also violate 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, because they burden core 
political speech and impose severe restrictions upon rights of free speech and political 
expression.19 
19
 The U.S. Constitution applies to this situation, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. 
Constitution does not require states to institute any initiative process. A state may choose not 
to provide its citizens with the right to initiate legislation; the U.S. Supreme Court has made 
clear, however, that if a state chooses to provide its citizens with an initiative process, that 
state must do so in a manner consistent with the U.S. Constitution. See Meyer v. Grant. 486 
U.S. 414, 420, 424-25 (1988): see also Bradv v. Ohman, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16206, *7 
(10th Cir. Jul. 15, 1998) (R. at 295). 
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A. The Challenged Provisions Must Be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny 
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that 
[a] court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh "the 
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against 
"the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule," taking into consideration "the extent to which those 
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights." 
Burdick v. Takushl 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citations omitted). Under this standard, the 
rigor of the reviewing court's inquiry into a state election law "depends upon the extent to 
which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights." Id. When 
voters' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights "are subjected to 'severe' restrictions" by a 
challenged election law, the law is subject to strict scrutiny—"the regulation must be 
'narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.'" Id. (citations 
omitted). However, when a state election law imposes only "reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
restrictions" upon First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, then "'the state's important 
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify' the restrictions." Id. (citations omitted). 
Although the "severe restriction" standard set forth in Burdick appears, by its terms, 
to apply to a challenge to any state election law, the U.S. Supreme Court has not applied the 
Burdick framework to challenges to all state election laws. In cases subsequent to Burdick. 
the Supreme Court has instituted another level of inquiry—before applying the 
Burdick framework, it first looks to see whether the challenged state law impacts "core 
political speech," rather than commercial speech or the mere "mechanics of the electoral 
process." See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182,186 
(1999) (applying strict scrutiny, without resort to Burdick, because the challenged law 
impacted "core political speech"); id. at 207-08 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that "[w]hen 
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a state's election law directly regulates core political speech, we have always subjected the 
challenged restriction to strict scrutiny," but stating that if the law merely regulates "the 
mechanics of the electoral process," the Burdick framework should be applied); Mclntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (stating that "[w]hen a law burdens core 
political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny'"). If the law burdens core political speech, strict 
scrutiny is applied, without resort to Burdick. 
In this case, the challenged provisions of Utah's initiative statute must be subject to 
strict scrutiny under either analysis. As discussed below, they impact "core political speech," 
and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny under Buckley, and they impose "severe 
restrictions" on free speech rights, and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny under Burdick. 
1. The challenged provisions burden "core political speech." 
Utah's initiative statute must be subjected to strict scrutiny because it impacts "core 
political speech." In Meyer v. Grant. 486 U.S. 414 (1988), certain citizens challenged a 
provision of Colorado's initiative statute that made it a crime to pay signature gatherers. The 
Court first needed to decide which level of scrutiny to apply to the Colorado provision. In 
reaching its determination, the Court emphasized that "the circulation of a petition involves 
the type of interactive communication concerning political change that is appropriately 
characterized as 'core political speech.'" Meyer. 486 U.S. at 421-22 (citations omitted). The 
Court further noted that the provision criminalizing the payment of signature gatherers 
restricts political expression in two ways: First it limits the number of voices 
who will convey appellees' message and the hours they can speak, and, 
therefore, limits the size of the audience they can reach. Second, it makes it less 
likely that appellees will garner the number of signatures necessary to place the 
matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of 
statewide discussion. 
Id. at 422-23. The Court proceeded to apply "exacting scrutiny" to the provision, noting in 
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the process that "the burden that Colorado must overcome to justify" its criminalization of the 
payment of signature gatherers "is well-nigh insurmountable." Id. at 420, 425. 
Similarly, in Buckley, the Court again strictly scrutinized certain provisions of 
Colorado's initiative statute. This time, citizens were challenging Colorado's requirements 
that signature gatherers be registered to vote in Colorado and wear an identification badge 
bearing their name; and that initiative sponsors report the names and addresses of all paid 
signature gatherers and the amount paid to each signature gatherer. The majority of the Court, 
without even citing to Burdick or using the Burdick analysis, proceeded to apply a form of 
strict scrutiny because the Colorado initiative statute impacted "core political speech," an area 
where First Amendment protection is "at its zenith." Buckley, 525 U.S. at 186, 192 & n.12. 
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, noted that "[w]hen a state's election law directly 
regulates core political speech, we have always subjected the challenged restriction to strict 
scrutiny," but stating that if the law merely regulates "the mechanics of the electoral process," 
the Burdick framework should be applied. Id. at 207-08. Ultimately, the Court applied a form 
of strict scrutiny to Colorado's initiative law, because it burdened core political speech. 
Like the Colorado initiative restrictions at issue in Meyer and Buckley, the restrictions 
imposed by Utah's initiative statute also burden core political speech and must therefore be 
subjected to strict scrutiny. As noted above, Safe Havens challenges, under the Utah 
Constitution, five different restrictions placed on the initiative right by Utah's new statute: (1) 
the Senate District Requirement; (2) the Signature Removal Provisions; (3) the Public 
Meetings Requirement; (4) the Same-or-Similar Ban; and (5) the One-Year Requirement. Safe 
Havens also brings a federal constitutional challenge to the first four (but not the fifth) of these 
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provisions.20 These four provisions, both individually and collectively, burden the circulation 
of initiative petitions, an activity which has been held to be "core political speech." See 
Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421-22, and the individual burdens imposed upon core political speech by 
each of the challenged provisions of the Utah initiative statute are greater than the burdens 
imposed by the Colorado regulations struck down in Meyer and Buckley. 
The Same-or-Similar Ban. The Same-or-Similar Ban severely restricts initiative-related 
speech and expression. This provision takes certain subjects, typically among the more hotly-
debated subjects in the state, and imposes a flat ban on those subjects for two years, cutting 
sponsors off before they even are able to begin speaking. It is difficult to imagine a more 
severe restriction on speech, one that is compounded by its content-based nature. 
In addition, the ban could amount to more than a two-year ban, if initiative opponents 
take advantage of this provision by filing sham initiatives, expending only token effort to 
gather a few signatures, designed to keep similar initiatives off of the ballot in future elections. 
The ban directly impacts the free speech rights of initiative sponsors, and clearly makes it less 
likely that sponsors will qualify an initiative for the ballot. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423. 
The Public Meetings Requirement. The Public Meetings Requirement imposes severe 
restrictions upon initiative-related speech and expression in Utah. As detailed at length above, 
this requirement substantially increases the costs of qualifying an initiative for the ballot. The 
increased costs will undoubtedly cause persons to abandon plans to bring initiatives which will 
20
 Safe Havens does not bring a federal challenge to the One-Year Requirement. The 
Tenth Circuit has previously upheld a six-month time limit. See American Const. Law 
Foundation v.Meyer, 120F.3d 1092,1098-99 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding a six-month signature 
gathering time limit constitutionally permissible). The ACLF case was taken to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, where it was re-captioned Buckley v. ACLF, but the Tenth Circuit's decision 
to uphold the signature-gathering time limit was not directly at issue in Buckley. Safe Havens 
has therefore opted to challenge this provision only under the Utah Constitution. 
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chill the quantum of speech on core political issues. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423. 
The Senate District Requirement. The Senate District Requirement imposes a severe 
burden on the core political speech and expression associated with the rights of Utahns to 
initiate legislation. As discussed above, to pass a statute through the Utah Senate, proponents 
need secure the votes of only 15 Senators—indeed, placing a constitutional amendment before 
the electorate requires the votes of only 20 Senators. Yet, to place an initiative before the 
electorate, sponsors must reach a 10% threshold in 26 Senate districts. 
This requirement clearly burdens speech, not only because it requires sponsors to speak 
in areas of the state where they may not otherwise have chosen to speak, but also because it 
"makes it less likely that [sponsors] will gamer the number of signatures necessary to place 
the matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide 
discussion." Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423. Indeed, as discussed above, initiatives only become the 
focus of true statewide discussion after they qualify for the ballot, not before. Gallivan, 2002 
UT 89, TJ63; R. at 281-94. Requiring initiative proponents to meet standards higher than those 
required of proponents of constitutional amendments is clearly a severe restriction, and one 
that chills speech by deterring Utah citizens from attempting to initiate legislation. R. at 121. 
The Signature Removal Provisions. The burdens imposed by the Senate District 
Requirement are magnified when that requirement is viewed in conjunction with the Signature 
Removal Provisions. As discussed above, those provisions (along with the Senate District 
Requirement) allow initiative opponents to focus on one or two (or at most, four) Senate 
districts, and, by persuading several hundred strategically-placed signers to remove their 
names from the petition, initiative opponents can, in one month and with far fewer resources, 
undo all of the sponsors' hard work and tens of thousands of signatures. In effect, the 
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legislature has created a one-month period in which initiative opponents are allowed unfettered 
free speech, but in which initiative sponsors' free speech is restricted. These provisions also 
make it less likely that an initiative will qualify for the ballot, and thus severely restrict 
initiative-related speech and expression in Utah. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423. 
Each of these provisions imposes severe restrictions upon Utahns' initiative-related 
speech and expression. However, collectively, these provisions impose an incredible burden 
on the initiative process, and have the effect of discouraging all but the most well-heeled 
interest groups from mounting an initiative campaign. In short, because Utah's new 
restrictions directly burden core political speech, they must be subjected to strict scrutiny. 
2. The challenged provisions impose "severe restrictions" on Utahns' 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
Moreover, even if the Burdick framework were to apply here, strict scrutiny would still 
be the result. As Justice Thomas noted, "restrictions on core political speech [] plainly impose 
a 'severe burden.'" See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 208. This fact alone, as discussed above, 
compels strict scrutiny. Moreover, the burdens imposed by Utah's new initiative statute are 
incredibly severe, a fact made plain by comparison to the relatively benign provisions of the 
Colorado initiative statute struck down in Buckley. 
In that case, the restrictions which the U.S. Supreme Court held burdened "core 
political speech" were restrictions requiring signature gatherers (a) to be registered to vote in 
Colorado, (b) to wear name badges, and (c) to report their income from signature gathering. 
These restrictions, while certainly annoying, did not impose a burden of the same magnitude 
as that imposed by the Utah restrictions. The Colorado restrictions directly at issue in Buckley 
contained no outright ban on certain initiatives, and did not concern the actual requirements 
for qualifying an initiative for the ballot. The Colorado restrictions imposed only an indirect 
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burden, as opposed to a direct burden, on initiative sponsors' ability to qualify an initiative for 
the ballot. Still, the Court intimated that the Colorado regulations imposed a "severe" burden 
on speech. See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 192 & n.12; id. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
Thus, even under a Burdick-style analysis, Utah's initiative statute must be subjected 
to strict scrutiny. Accordingly, whether or not the Burdick framework is applied, this Court 
must apply strict scrutiny to the challenged provisions of Utah's initiative statute. 
B. The Challenged Provisions Cannot Pass Muster Under Strict Scrutiny 
To pass muster under strict constitutional scrutiny, the challenged statutory provision 
must be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 192 
& n.12; id. at 207 (Thomas, J., concurring); Burdick. 504 U.S. at 434. 
As discussed above, supra Part II.B, the challenged provisions do not serve any state 
interest that rises to the level of "compelling." And, even assuming such an interest existed, 
the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve those interests, because there are other, less 
burdensome ways to further the asserted interests of the legislature. 
IV. SEVERABILITY—THE OFFENDING PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE ARE 
SEVERABLE FROM THE REMAINDER 
Because portions of Utah's initiative statute are unconstitutional and must be struck 
down, the final question surrounds severability, and whether the offending portions of the 
statute are severable from the remainder. For the reasons set forth below, the offending 
portions of the statute are in fact severable from the remainder, because an operable statute 
remains in place under which initiatives may be qualified for the ballot. 
A. General Severability Principles—The Presumption of Severability 
Any analysis of the severability question must begin with the "general rule" that 
"' statutes, where possible, are to be construed so as to sustain their constitutionality. 
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Accordingly, if a portion of the statute might be saved by severing the part that is 
unconstitutional, such should be done.'" See State v. Lopes. 1999 UT 24, ^ [18,980 P.2d 191 
(citations omitted). Thus, there is a presumption that the unconstitutional portion of the statute 
can be severed without affecting the remainder. 
This presumption can, of course, be overcome with a showing that the legislature 
intended that the unconstitutional portion of the statute not be severable from the remainder. 
See, e.g.. Stewart v. Utah Public Serv. Comm,n. 885 P.2d 759, 779 (Utah 1994) (stating that 
severability "is primarily a matter of legislative intent"). In some cases (like this one), the 
legislature places a severability provision into the statute, explicitly setting forth its intent 
regarding severability. If such a provision exists, then legislative intent is plain. More often, 
however, the legislature does not expressly set forth its intent regarding the severability of 
statutory provisions. In such cases, courts must "turn to the statute itself, and examine the 
remaining constitutional portion of the statute in relation to the stricken portion. If the 
remainder of the statute is operable and still furthers the intended legislative purpose, the 
statute will be allowed to stand." Lopes. 1999 UT 24, f 19, 980 P.2d 191. 
B. Legislative Intent 
The Utah legislature included in S.B. 28 a severability provision, but one which is 
extremely narrow. That provision reads in its entirety as follows: 
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), it is the intent of the Legislature 
that if any provision of this act, or the application of any provision of 
this act to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of 
this act shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
(2) It is the intent of the Legislature that: 
(a) Subsection 20 A-7-201 (1 )(a)(ii) [requiring sponsors of an 
initiative to be submitted to the Legislature, rather than to 
the people, to reach a 5% threshold in 26 of 29 Utah 
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Senate districts] is not severable from Subsection 20A-7-
201(l)(a)(i) [the general statewide 5% threshold]; and 
(b) Subsection 20 A-7-201 (2)(a)(ii) [requiring sponsors of an 
initiative to be submitted to the people to reach a 10% 
threshold in 26 of 29 Utah Senate districts] is not 
severable from Subsection 20A-7-201 (2)(a)(i) [the general 
statewide 10% threshold]. 
See R. at 220. Thus, it is clear, from Subsection (1), that the legislature intended that (a) the 
Public Meetings Requirement, (b) the Signature Removal Provisions, (c) the Same-or-Similar 
Ban, and (d) the One-Year Requirement all be severable from the remainder of the statute. 
Regarding the Senate District Requirement, however, the legislature is of a different 
(and very specific) mind, as set forth in Subsection (2). It has stated that the Senate District 
Requirement is not severable from the general statewide 10% threshold, meaning that if the 
Senate District Requirement is struck down, the general 10% statewide threshold falls as well. 
However, the severability provision is extremely narrow, and specifically does not state that, 
if the Senate District Requirement falls, the entire statute must also fall. The Senate District 
Requirement is specifically not severable only from the general 10% threshold. 
C. The Result of the Severability Provision 
The result of the very specific and narrow severability provision is that, if all five of the 
provisions which Safe Havens challenges are struck down, the following statutory scheme will 
be in place: sponsors may qualify an initiative for the ballot without obtaining any signatures 
and without holding any public meetings. Sponsors will be required only to submit an 
application to the lieutenant governor, who will review the application for constitutionality and 
absurdity (but will not be able to reject applications based on the same-or-similar requirement) 
and approve or reject it. Because no signature requirement exists, but the rest of the statute 
is expressly intact under the legislature's severability provision, the county clerks must still 
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check each signature for accuracy and pass them along to the lieutenant governor, who then 
must mark "sufficient" all initiative packets, no matter how many signatures the sponsors have 
gathered. While this result may seem strange, it is in fact compelled by the plain language of 
the legislature's own severability provision. 
This statutory scheme, while certainly different from past initiative statutes, is certainly 
"operable" and certainly furthers the purpose of facilitating the right of Utah citizens to initiate 
legislation. See Lopes. 1999 UT 24,^19,980 P.2d 191 (stating that "[i]fthe remainder of the 
statute is operable and still furthers the intended legislative purpose, the statute will be allowed 
to stand"). Thus, if this Court agrees with Safe Havens that the challenged portions of the 
statute are unconstitutional, then Safe Havens is entitled to a declaration that it will be able to 
qualify its initiative for the ballot without complying with a specific signature requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is Safe Havens (and not Defendants) who are entitled 
to summary judgment. This Court should declare that either (a) the new provisions of S.B. 28 
do not apply to Safe Havens, or (b) the challenged provisions are unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, the Order and Judgment of the district court should be reversed, and this case 
should be remanded to the district court with instructions to grant Safe Havens' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
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DATED this 15th day of August, 2003. 
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Tab A 
187 ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE VOTERS 20A-7-201 
20A-7-103. Constitutional amendments and other ques-
tions — Procedures for submission to popular 
vote. 
(1) The procedures contained in this section govern when: 
(a) the Legislature submits a proposed constitutional amendment or 
other question to the voters; and 
(b) an act of the Legislature is referred to the voters by referendum 
petition. 
(2) In addition to the publication in the voter information pamphlet re-
quired by Section 20A-7-702, the l ieutenant governor shall, not more than 60 
days or less than ten days before the regular general election, publish the full 
text of the amendment, question, or s ta tute in at least one newspaper in every 
county of the state where a newspaper is published. 
(3) The legislative general counsel shall: 
(a) entitle each proposed constitutional amendment "Constitutional 
Amendment Number " and give it a number; 
(b) entitle each proposed question "State Proposition Number " 
and give it a number; 
(c) entitle each state referendum that has qualified for the ballot 
"Citizen's State Referendum Number " and give it a number; 
(d) draft and designate a ballot title tha t summarizes the subject 
mat ter of the amendment or question; and 
(e) deliver them to the lieutenant governor. 
(4) The lieutenant governor shall certify the number and ballot title of each 
amendment or question to the county clerk of each county no later than the 
second Friday after the primary election. 
(5) The county clerk of each county shall: 
(a) ensure that both the number and title of the amendment, question, 
or referendum is printed on the sample ballots and official ballots; and 
(b) publish them as provided by law. 
History: C. 1953, 20A-7-103, enacted by L. presentation on the ballot" and changed the 
1995, ch. 340, $ 20; 2001, ch. 57, § 4; 2002, subsection designations 
ch . 127, § 1. The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, 
Amendment Notes . — The 2001 amend-
 m Subsection (2) added the phrase at the be-
ment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted Sub- ginning ending with "Section 20A-7-702" and 
sections (3)(a), (3)(b), and (3)(c) for former Sub- substituted "not more than 60 days or less than 
section (3)(a) which read "designate the ten days" for "not later than 60 days " 
amendment or question by number and order of 
PART 2 
STATEWIDE INITIATIVES 
20A-7-201. Statewide initiatives — Signature require-
ments — Submission to the Legislature or to a 
vote of the people. 
(1) (a) A person seeking to have an initiative submitted to the Legislature 
for approval or rejection shall obtain: 
(i) legal signatures equal to 5% of the cumulative total of all votes 
cast for all candidates for governor at the last regular general election 
at which a governor was elected; and 
20A-7-201 ELECTION CODE 188 
(n) from each of at least 26 Utah State Senate districts, legal 
signatures equal to 5'# of the total of all votes cast in tha t district for 
all candidates for governor at the last regular general election at 
which a governor was elected 
Ob) If, at any time not less than ten days before the beginning of an 
annual general session of the Legislature, the lieutenant governor de-
clares sufficient any initiative petition tha t is signed by enough voters to 
meet the requirements of this Subsection (1), the lieutenant governor shall 
deliver a copy of the petition and the cover sheet required by Subsection 
(l)(c) to the president of the Senate, the speaker of the House, and the 
director of the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel 
(c) In delivering a copy of the petition, the lieutenant governor shall 
include a cover sheet that contains 
d) the cumulative total of all votes cast for all candidates for 
governor at the last regular general election at which a governor was 
elected, 
(n) the total of all votes cast in each Utah State Senate district for 
all candidates for governor at the last regular general election at 
which a governor was elected, 
(m) the total number of certified signatures received for the sub-
mitted initiative, and 
(IV) the total number of certified signatures received from each 
Utah State Senate district for the submitted initiative 
(2) (a) A person seeking to have an initiative submitted to a vote of the 
people for approval or rejection shall obtain 
d) legal signatures equal to 10% of the cumulative total of all votes 
cast for all candidates for governor at the last regular general election 
at which a governor was elected, and 
(n) from each of at least 26 Utah State Senate districts, legal 
signatures equal to 10% of the total of all votes cast in tha t district for 
all candidates for governor at the last regular general election at 
which a governor was elected 
(b) If, at any time not less than four months before any regular general 
election, the lieutenant governor declares sufficient any initiative petition 
tha t is signed by enough legal voters to meet the requirements of this 
subsection, the lieutenant governor shall submit the proposed law to a 
vote of the people at the next regular general election 
(3) The lieutenant governor shall provide the following information from the 
official canvass of the last regular general election at which a governor was 
elected to any interested person 
(a) the cumulative total of all votes cast for all candidates for governor, 
and 
(b) for each Utah State Senate district, the total of all votes cast in tha t 
district for all candidates for governor 
History: C. 1953,20A-7-201, enacted by L. 
1994, ch. 1, * 11; 1995, ch. 152, § 8; 1998, ch. 
1 3 M 1; 1999, ch. 115, § 1; 2003, ch. 304, * 1. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1999 amend 
ment, effective May 3 1999, rewrote Subsec 
tion (l)(b) and added Subsection (l)(c) 
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, 
substituted "26 Utah State Senate districts" for 
"20 counties" in Subsections (D(aXn) and 
(2)(a)(n), substituted "Utah State Senate dis 
tnct" for 'county" in Subsections (l)(c)(n), 
(lXc)dv), and (3)(b), and substituted "district" 
for "count>" in Subsections (l)(a)(n), (2)(a)(n), 
and (3 Kb) 
Severabi l i ty Clauses. — Laws 2003 ch 
304 § 9 provides that Subsection (l)(a)(u) is not 
severable from Subsection (l)(a)(i) and Subsec-
tion (2)(a)(n) is not severable from Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) 
189 ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE VOTERS 20A-7-202 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ment to the U S Constitution Gallivan v 
Walker, 2002 UT 89, 54 P3d 1069 
Constitutionality 
Severability Severabil ity. 
Constitutionality. Unconstitutional multi-county signature re-
The multi county signature requirement of quirement of Subsection (2)(a)(n) (before the 
Subsection (2)(a)(n) (before the 2003 amend- 2003 amendment substituted Senate districts 
ment substituted Senate districts for counties) for counties and added a nonseverability provi 
violated the uniform operation of laws provi- sion) was severable from the rest of the mitia-
sion of the Utah Constitution, Art I § 24, and tive enabling statute Gallivan v Walker, 2002 
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend- UT 89, 54 P 3d 1069 
20A-7-202. Statewide initiative process — Application 
procedures — Time to gather signatures — 
Grounds for rejection. 
(1) Persons wishing to circulate an initiative petition shall file an applica-
tion with the lieutenant governor 
(2) The application shall contain 
(a) the name and residence address of at least five sponsors of the 
initiative petition, 
(b) a statement indicating that each of the sponsors 
(I) is a resident of Utah, and 
(n) has voted in a regular general election in Utah within the last 
three years, 
(c) the signature of each of the sponsors, attested to by a notary public, 
(d) a copy of the proposed law, and 
(e) a statement indicating whether or not persons gathering signatures 
for the petition may be paid for doing so 
(3) The application and its contents are public when filed with the lieuten-
ant governor 
(4) (a) The sponsors shall qualify the petition for the regular general 
election ballot no later than one year after the application is filed 
(b) If the sponsors fail to qualify the petition for that ballot, the 
sponsors must 
d) submit a new application, 
(n) obtain new signature sheets, and 
(in) collect signatures again 
(5) The lieutenant governor shall reject the application and not issue 
circulation sheets if 
(a) the law proposed by the initiative is patently unconstitutional, 
(b) the law proposed by the initiative is nonsensical, 
(c) the proposed law could not become law if passed, or 
(d) the law proposed by the initiative is identical or substantially 
similar to a law proposed by an initiative that was submitted to the county 
clerks and lieutenant governor for certification and evaluation within two 
years preceding the date on which the application for this initiative was 
filed. 
History: C. 1953, 20A-7-202, enacted by L. "resident of Utah for 'registered voter ' in Sub 
1994, ch. 1, ^ 12; 1995, ch. 153, ^ 1; 1999, ch. section (2)(b)(i) 
45, * 9; 2003, ch. 304, ^ 2. The 200 3 amendment effective May 5 2003 
Amendment Notes — I he 1999 amend added Subsection (2)(e) substituted 'one year ' 
ment effective March 15 1999 substituted for 'the second regular general election' in 
20A-7-203 ELECTION CODE 190 
Subsection (4)(a), added Subsection (5)(d), and if held imalid, severable from the remainder of 
made related changes the act, which also amended H 20A-7-201, 
Severabil ity Clauses. — Laws 2003, ch 20A-7-203, 20A-7-207, 20A-7-213, 20A-11-702, 
304, ^ 9 makes the amendments to this section, and 20A-11-802 and enacted ^ 20A-7-204 1 
20A-7-203. Form of initiative peti t ion and signature 
sheets. 
(1) (a) Each proposed initiative petition shall be printed in substantially 
the following form: 
"INITIATIVE PETITION To the Honorable , Lieutenant Gov-
ernor: 
We, the undersigned citizens of Utah, respectfully demand that the 
following proposed law be submitted to the legal voters/Legislature of 
Utah for their/its approval or rejection at the regular general elec-
tion/session to be held/beginning on (month/day/year); 
Each signer says: 
I have personally signed this petition; 
I am registered to vote in Utah or intend to become registered to vote in 
Utah before the certification of the petition names by the county clerk; and 
My residence and post office address are written correctly after my 
name. 
NOTICE TO SIGNERS: 
Public hearings to discuss this petition were held at: (list dates and 
locations of public hearings.)" 
(b) The sponsors of an initiative shall attach a copy of the proposed law 
to each initiative petition. 
(2) Each signature sheet shall: 
(a) be printed on sheets of paper 8-V2 inches long and 11 inches wide; 
(b) be ruled with a horizontal line 3A inch from the top, with the space 
above that line blank for the purpose of binding; 
(c) contain the title of the initiative printed below the horizontal line; 
(d) contain the word "Warning" printed or typed at the top of each 
signature sheet under the title of the initiative; 
(e) contain, to the right of the word "Warning," the following statement 
printed or typed in not less than eight-point, single leaded type: 
"It is a class A misdemeanor for anyone to sign any initiative petition 
with any other name than his own, or knowingly to sign his name more 
than once for the same measure, or to sign an initiative petition when he 
knows he is not a registered voter and knows tha t he does not intend to 
become registered to vote before the certification of the petition names by 
the county clerk."; and 
(f) be vertically divided into columns as follows: 
(i) the first column shall appear at the extreme left of the sheet, be 
% inch wide, be headed with "For Office Use Only," and be subdivided 
with a light vertical line down the middle with the left subdivision 
entitled "Registered" and the right subdivision left untitled; 
(ii) the next column shall be three inches wide, headed "Registered 
Voter's Printed Name (must be legible to be counted)"; 
(iii) the next column shall be three inches wide, headed "Signature 
of Registered Voter"; and 
(iv) the final column shall be 4-% inches wide, headed "Street 
Address, City, Zip Code". 
(3) The final page of each initiative packet shall contain the following 
printed or typed statement: 
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"Verification 
State of Utah, County of. 
I, , of ., hereby state that: 
I am a resident of Utah and am at least 18 years old; 
All the names that appear in this packet were signed by persons who 
professed to be the persons whose names appear in it, and each of them signed 
his name on it in my presence; 
I believe that each has printed and signed his name and written his post 
office address and residence correctly, and tha t each signer is registered to vote 
in Utah or intends to become registered to vote before the certification of the 
petition names by the county clerk. 
I have not paid or given anything of value to any person who signed this 
petition to encourage them to sign it. 
(Name) (Residence Address) (Date)" 
(4) The forms prescribed in this section are not mandatory, and, if substan-
tially followed, the initiative petitions are sufficient, notwithstanding clerical 
and merely technical errors. 
History: C. 1953,20A-7-203, enac ted by L. 1, 2000, updated the date line in Subsection 
1994, ch. 1, * 13; 1995, ch. 153, $ 2; 1999, ch . (l)(a) 
45, § 10; 2000, ch. 3, § 5; 2000, ch. 75, § 11; The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, 
2003, ch. 304, § 3. added the requirement to list public hearings m 
Amendment Notes . — The 1999 amend- Subsection (l)(a), deleted former Subsection 
ment, effective March 15, 1999, substituted "a (2)(f) concerning ruled lines under the Warning 
resident of Utah" for "registered to vote in statement, added the last sentence in Subsec-
Utah" m the fourth line of the form in Subsec- tion (3), and made related changes 
tion (3) Severabi l i ty C l ause s . — Laws 2003, ch 
The 2000 amendment by ch 3, effective May 304, § 9 makes the amendments to this section, 
1, 2000, updated the date line in Subsection if held invalid, severable from the remainder of 
(l)(a) and added the age requirement "at least the act, which also amended §§ 20A-7-201, 
18 years old" to Subsection (3) 20A-7-202, 20A-7-207, 20A-7-213, 20A-11-702, 
The 2000 amendment by ch 75, effective May and 20A-11-802 and enacted § 20A-7-204 1 
20A-7-204.1. Public hearings to be held before initiative 
petitions are circulated. 
(1) (a) Before circulating initiative petitions for signature statewide, spon-
sors of the initiative petition shall hold at least seven public hearings 
throughout Utah as follows: 
(i) one in the Bear River region — Box Elder, Cache, or Rich 
County; 
(ii) one in the Southwest region — Beaver, Garfield, Iron, Kane, or 
Washington County; 
(iii) one in the Mountain region — Summit, Utah, or Wasatch 
County; 
(iv) one in the Central region — Juab , Millard, Piute, Sanpete, 
Sevier, or Wayne County, 
(v) one in the Southeast region — Carbon, Emery, Grand, or San 
J u a n County; 
(vi) one in the Uintah Basin region — Daggett, Duchesne, or 
Uintah County; and 
(vii) one in the Wasatch Front region — Davis, Morgan, Salt Lake, 
Tooele, or Weber County 
(b) Of the seven meetings, at least two of the meetings must be held in 
a first or second class county, but not in the same county 
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(2) At least three calendai days before the date of the public hearing, the 
sponsors shall 
(a) provide written notice of the public hearing to 
(1) the lieutenant governor for posting on the state's website, and 
(n) each state senator, state representative, and county commission 
or county council member who is elected in whole or in part from the 
region where the public hearing will be held, and 
(b) publish written notice of the public hearing detailing its time, date, 
and location in at least one newspaper of general circulation in each 
county in the region where the public hearing will be held 
(3) (a) During the public hearing, the sponsors shall either 
d) video tape or audio tape the public hearing and, when the 
hearing is complete, deposit the complete audio or video tape of the 
meeting with the lieutenant governor, or 
(n) take comprehensive minutes of the public hearing, detailing the 
names and titles of each speaker and summarizing each speaker's 
comments 
(b) The lieutenant governor shall make copies of the tapes or minutes 
available to the public 
History C 1953, 20A-7-204 1, enacted by also amended ^ 20A 7 201 to 20A 7 203 20A 
L 2003, ch 304, ** 4. 7 207 20A 7 213 20A 11 702 and 20A 11 802 
Severabil ity Clauses — Laws 2003 ch Effective Dates — Laws 2003 ch 304 
304 § 9 makes this section if held invalid became effective on May 5 2003, pursuant to 
severable fi om the remainder of the act which Utah Const Art VI Sec 25 
20A-7-205. Obtaining s ignatures — Verification — Re-
moval of s ignature . 
(1) Any Utah voter may sign an initiative petition if the voter is a legal 
voter 
(2) The sponsors shall ensure tha t the person in whose presence each 
signature sheet was signed 
(a) is at least 18 years old and meets the residency requirements of 
Section 20A-2-105, and 
Ob) verifies each signature sheet by completing the verification printed 
on the last page of each initiative packet 
(3) (a) d) Any voter who has signed an initiative petition may have his 
signature removed from the petition by submitting a notarized 
statement to that effect to the county clerk 
(n) In order for the signature to be removed, the statement must be 
received by the county clerk before he delivers the petition to the 
lieutenant governor 
(b) Upon receipt of the statement, the county clerk shall remove the 
signature of the person submitting the s tatement from the initiative 
petition 
(c) No one may remove signatures from an initiative petition after the 
petition is submitted to the l ieutenant governor 
History C 1953, 20A-7 205, enacted by L. vote in Utah redesignating existing Subsec 
1994, ch. 1, <* 15; 1995, ch 153, t> 4,1995,'ch. tions (2Kb) and (2)(c) as (2)(a) and (2Kb) 
165, 6 1, 1999, ch. 45, <* 11, 2000, ch. 3, * 6. The 2000 amendment, effective May 1 2000, 
Amendment Notes . — The 1999 amend
 a dded the age lequirement at least 18 yeais 
ment effective March 15 1999 deleted former
 0\d to Subsection (2)(a) 
Subsection (2)(a) which read is registered to 
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ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 1. [Three departments of government.] 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability 
d i m e s and criminal procedure 
— Parole 
Judicial infringement 
Legislative infringement 
Applicability. 
This section does not limit the authonty of 
the Utah Department of Transportation 
(UDOT), as an administrative body, to make 
lules because, although administrative bodies 
are nominally designated a part of the execu 
tive branch, they do not fall within the consti-
tutional definition of the Executive Depart-
ment, therefore, the prohibition of Art V, Sec I 
does not apply Robinson \ State, 2001 UT 21, 
20 P 3d 396 
Crimes and criminal procedure. 
—Parole . 
The Board of Pardons' exercise of its parole 
power in setting determinate paiole dates does 
not violate the separation of powers doctrine 
Padilla v Utah Bd of Pardons & Parole, 947 
P2d 664 (Utah 1997) 
Judicial infringement. 
Allowing a court to select a paiticulai piose 
cutor to appear and prosecute a cuminal case 
appears to be an impeimissible mfi mgement 
upon the executive branch's duty and right to 
direct the prosecution Salt Lake City v 
Dorman-Ligh, 912 P2d 452 (Utah Ct App 
1996) 
Section 59-1-601, which purports to giant the 
district court jurisdiction to review by tua l de 
novo final decisions of the state tax commission 
resulting from formal hearings, is unconstitu-
tional under Utah Const , Art XIII, Sec 11 and 
this section Evans & Sutherland Computer 
Corp v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P2d 435 
(Utah 1997) 
Legis lat ive infringement. 
Section 78 51-25, prohibiting the unautho-
rized practice of law, did not encroach on the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to 
regulate the practice of law as granted by Utah 
Const , Art VIII, § 4 Board of Comm'rs of State 
Bar v Petersen, 937 P2d 1263 (Utah 1997) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Case Law Develop-
ment Constitutional Law — Code Provisions 
Providing for Legislative Appointments to Ju-
dicial Conduct Commission Held Constitu-
tional, 1998 Utah L Rev 596 
Recent Developments in Utah Law —Admin-
istrative Law, 2001 Utah L Rev 1019 
ARTICLE VI 
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 
Section 
1 [Power vested in Senate, House and Peo-
ple 1 
2 [Time of general sessions ] 
3 [Election of House members — Terms 1 
4 [Election of Senators — Terms 1 
Section 
5 [Who is eligible as a legislator J 
29 [Lending public credit forbidden — Excep-
tion 1 
32 [Appointment of additional employees — 
Legal counsel 1 
Section 1. [Power vested in Senate, House and People.] 
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in 
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated 
the Legislature of the State of Utah, and 
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2). 
43 LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Art. VI, § 1 
(2) (a) (i) The legal voters of the State of Utah in the numbers, under the 
conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, 
may: 
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted 
to the people for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on 
the legislation, as provided by statute; or 
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those 
laws passed by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each 
house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the voters of the 
State, as provided by statute, before the law may take effect 
(ii) Nothwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated 
to allow, limit, or prohibit the taking of wildlife or the season for or 
method of taking wildlife shall be adopted upon approval of two-thirds 
of those voting. 
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under 
the conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, 
may: 
(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to 
the people of the county, city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote 
of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute; or 
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of 
the county, city, or town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as 
provided by statute, before the law or ordinance may take effect. 
History: Const. 1896; Nov. 6, 1900; 1998, 
S.J.R. 10, ^ 1; 1999, S.J.R. 5, *> 3. 
Amendment Notes . — Laws 1998, S J R 
10, § 1 proposed amending this section to add 
the second sentence of the second paragraph in 
Subsection 2 The proposed amendment was 
approved by the voters of the state at the 1998 
general election and took effect on January 1, 
1999 
Laws 1999, S J R 5, § 3 proposed amending 
this section The amendment subdivided the 
section, added "Notwithstanding Subsection 
ANAI YSIS 
Administrative bodies 
Initiative and referendum 
Cited 
Administrat ive bodies . 
Although Utah Const , Art VI, Sec 1 does 
restrict the ability of the legislature to delegate 
legislative functions to administrative agen-
cies, the legislature specifically granted the 
Utah Department of Tiansportation the power 
to enact administrative tules in the language of 
§ 72 1-201 Robinson v State, 2001 UT 21, 20 
P 3d 396 
(2)(a)(i)(A)" in Subsection (2)(a)(n), in Subsec-
tion (2) substituted "adoption upon a majority 
vote" for "a vote of the people for approval or 
rejection" twice, "statute" for "law" twice, "in 
the numbers" for "such fractional part thereof" 
twice, and "county, city, or town" for "legal 
subdivision" or "legal subdivision of the State" 
m three places, and made numerous stylistic 
changes throughout the section The amend-
ment was approved by the electors of the state 
and took effect on January 1, 2001 
Init iative and referendum. 
The provision of ^ 20A-7-501 for submission 
of an initiative to voters of a city at the next 
municipal general election is not an unreason-
able restraint on the rights of the electorate by 
the legislature in limiting the opportunity for 
city-wide initiatives to two-year intervals 
Owens v Hunt, 882 P2d 660 (Utah 1994) 
Cited in Biglei v Vemon, 858 P2d 1391 
(Utah 1993), A B v State, 936 P2d 1091 (Utah 
Ct App 1997), cert granted, 945 P2d 1118 
(Utah 1997), Galiivan v Walker, 2002 UT 89, 54 
P3d 1069, Low v City of MonticeUo, 2002 UT 
90 54 P3d 1153 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. I, § 24 
project did not unconstitutionally grant bene-
fits to private individuals, any benefits were 
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-
ANALYSIS 
In general 
Age of majority 
Agent for service of process 
Automobile license law 
Construction with Art VI, § 26 
Contract carrier permit 
Cosmetologists' license law 
Criminal actions 
—In vesti gations 
—Prosecution 
—Sentence 
Criminal sentence 
Disparate tax assessments 
Excess revenue refunds 
Guest statutes 
Inheritance Tax Law 
Insurance premium tax exemption 
Intoxicating liquor 
Licenses 
Massage parlor ordinance 
Municipal employment prerequisites 
Notice requirements 
Property 
—Responsibility for water service 
Public employees' retirement system 
Public officers' bonds 
Public officers' salaries 
Road poll tax 
School activities 
Search warrants 
Sunday closing laws 
Tax sales 
Unfair Practices Act 
In general. 
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever 
uniform laws can be enacted State v 
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P 894, 26 A L R 
696 (1921) 
Objects and purposes of law present touch-
stone for determining proper and improper 
mmation of urban blight Tribe v Salt Lake 
City Corp , 540 P 2d 499 (Utah 1975) 
vate or special laws, Utah Const , Art VI, Sec 
26 
classifications State v Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 
P 2d 920,117 A L R 330 (1938), State v J B & 
R E Walker, Inc , 100 Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766 
(1941) 
One who assails legislative classification as 
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such 
State v J B & R E Walker, Inc , 100 Utah 
523, 116 P 2 d 766 (1941) 
Classification is never unreasonable or arbi-
trary in its inclusion or exclusion features so 
long as there is some basis for differentiation 
between classes or subject matters included, as 
compared to those excluded, provided differen-
tiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of 
act State v J B & R E Walker, Inc , 100 Utah 
523, 116 P 2d 766 (1941) 
Before legislative enactment can be inter-
fered with, court must be able to say that there 
is no fair reason for the law that would not 
require equally its extension to those which it 
leaves untouched State v J B & R E Walker, 
I nc , 100 Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766 (1941) 
Only where some persons or transactions ex-
cluded from operation of law are, as to the sub-
ject matter of the law, in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation, is the law 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary 
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis 
to differentiate can be found, law must be held 
constitutional State v J B & R E Walker, 
I nc , 100 Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766 (1941) 
Inability of legislature to make perfect clas 
sification does not render statute unconstitu 
tional State v J B & R E Walker, Inc , 100 
Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766 (1941) 
In determining whether classification made 
by legislature is unconstitutional discrimina-
tion is very essence of classification and is not 
objectionable unless founded upon unreason-
able distinctions Gronlund v Salt Lake City, 
113 Utah 284 194 P 2d 464 (1948) 
An act is never unconstitutional because of 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am J u r 2d Franchises C. J . S . — 37 C J S Franchises $ 26 
§§ 9 to 23 Key Numbers. — Franchises <s=> 11 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws,] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Art. I, § 15 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
P.2d 1302 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894, 
104 S. Ct. 241, 78 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1983). 
Cited in State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1301 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitu-
tional Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 82. 
Note, State v. Nielsen: Immaterial False 
Statements in Search Warrant Affidavits, 1987 
Utah L. Rev. 753. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legis-
lative Enactments — Labor Law, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 284. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Criminal Procedure, 1989 
Utah L. Rev. 223. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — An Ana-
lytical Model to Assure Consideration of Pa-
rental and Familial Interests When Defining 
the Constitutional Rights of Minors — An Ex-
amination of In re Scott K , 1980 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 598. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note 
discussing "open fields" doctrine, 11 J. 
Contemp. L. 531 (1985). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 68 Am. Jur . 2d Searches 
and Seizures § 6 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures 
§ 3 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility, in civil case, of evi-
dence obtained by unlawful search and seizure, 
5 A.L.R.3d 670. 
Lawfulness of seizure of property used in vio-
lation of law as prerequisite to forfeiture action 
or proceeding, 8 A.L.R.3d 473. 
Validity of consent to search given one in 
custody of officers, 9 A.L.R.3d 858. 
Traffic violation: lawfulness of search of mo-
tor vehicle following arrest for traffic violation, 
10 A.L.R.3d 314. 
Propriety of considering hearsay or other in-
competent evidence in establishing probable 
cause for issuance of search warrant , 10 
A.L.R.3d 359. 
Criminal liability for obstructing process as 
affected by invalidity or irregularity of the pro-
cess, 10 A.L.R.3d 1146. 
Sufficiency of description, in search warrant, 
of apartment or room to be searched in multi-
pie-occupancy structure, 11 A.L.R.3d 1330. 
Modern status of rule as to validity of 
nonconsentual search and seizure made with-
out warrant after lawful arrest as affected by 
lapse of time between, or difference in places 
of, arrest and search, 19 A.L.R.3d 727. 
Plea of guilty as waiver of claim of unlawful 
search and seizure, 20 A.L.R.Sd 724. 
Propriety of execution of search warrant at 
nighttime, 26 A.L.R.3d 951. 
Propriety of governmental eavesdropping on 
communications between accused and his at-
torney, 44 A.L.R.4th 841. 
Validity of arrest made in reliance upon un-
corrected or outdated warrant list or similar 
police records, 45 A.L.R.4th 550. 
Officer's ruse to gain entry as affecting ad-
missibility of plain-view evidence—modern 
cases, 47 A.L.R.4th 425. 
Search and seizure: necessity that police ob-
tain warrant before taking possession of, ex-
amining, or testing evidence discovered in 
search by private person, 47 A.L.R.4th 501. 
Eavesdropping on extension telephone as in-
vasion of privacy, 49 A.L.R.4th 430. 
Propriety of state or local government health 
officer's warrantless search — post-Camara 
cases, 53 A.L.R.4th 1168. 
Seizure of books, documents, or other papers 
under search warrant not describing such 
items, 54 A.LR.4th 391. 
Search and seizure of telephone company 
records pertaining to subscriber as violation of 
subscriber's constitutional rights. 76 A.L.R.4th 
536. 
Necessity tha t Miranda warnings include ex-
press reference to right to have attorney 
present during interrogation, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 
123. 
Fourth Amendment as prohibiting strip 
searches of arrestees or pretrial detainees, 78 
A.L.R. Fed. 201. 
Key Numbers. — Searches and Seizures «=» 
2, 7(1). 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the 
press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the t ru th may be given in evidence 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury tha t the matter charged as 
libelous is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the 
law and the fact. 
112 
AMENDMENT I—FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH AND 
PRESS; PEACEFUL ASSEMBLAGE; PETITION 
OF GRIEVANCES 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances. 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
Proposal and Ratification of Amend-
ments 1 to 10 
The first ten amendments to the Con-
stitution of the United States, which 
comprise the Bill of Rights, set out in 1 
Stat. 97, were proposed to the Legisla-
tures of the several States by the First 
Congress, on September 25, 1789. They 
were ratified by the following States, 
and the notifications of ratification by 
the governors or secretaries of state 
thereof were communicated successively 
by the President to Congress: New Jer-
sey, November 20, 1789; Maryland, De-
cember 19, 1789; North Carolina, De-
cember 22, 1789; South Carolina, Janu-
ary 19, 1790; New Hampshire, January 
25, 1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; 
Pennsylvania, March 10, 1790; New 
York, March 27, 1790; Rhode Island, 
June 15, 1790; Vermont, November 3, 
1791, and Virginia, December 15, 1791. 
The Legislatures of Connecticut, Geor-
gia, and Massachusetts ratified them on 
April 19, 1939, March 18, 1939, and 
March 2, 1939, respectively. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
WESTLAW supplements U.S.C.A. electronically and is useful for additional 
research. Enter a citation in INSTA-CITE for display of parallel citations 
and case history. Enter a constitution, statute or rule citation in a case law 
database for cases of interest. 
Example query for INSTA-CITE: 790 F.2d 978 
Example query for United States Constitution: (first +6 amendment) +s 
religion 
Example query for statute: "42 U.S.C.*" +4 1983 
Also, see the WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this 
volume. 
Twelve articles were proposed on Sep-
tember 25, 1789. The first two, which 
failed of adoption, read as follows: 
"Art. I. After the first enumeration 
required by the first article of the Consti-
tution, there shall be one representation 
for every thirty thousand, until the num-
ber shall amount to one hundred, after 
which the proportion shall be so regulat-
ed by Congress, that there shall be not 
less than one hundred representatives, 
nor less than one representative for ev-
ery forty thousand persons, until the 
number of representatives shall amount 
to two hundred; after which the propor-
tion shall be so regulated by Congress, 
that there shall not be less than two 
hundred representatives, nor more than 
one representative for every fifty thou-
sand persons. 
"Art. II. No law varying the compen-
sation for the services of the senators 
and representatives shall take effect, un-
til an election of representatives shall 
have intervened." 
AMENDMENT XIV—CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMU-
NITIES; DUE PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPOR-
TIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION; DISQUALIFICATION 
OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT 
Materials for the Citizenship and Privileges and Immunities 
Clauses of Section 1 are set out in this volume. See the 
following three volumes for materials pertaining to the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of that section and 
Sections 2 to 5. 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the sev-
eral States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of 
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a 
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of 
the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, 
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representa-
tion therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3- No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any 
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or 
as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State 
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort 
to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds 
of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pen-
sions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
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lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any 
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for 
the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obli-
gations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
Proposal and Ratification 
This amendment was proposed to the 
legislatures of the several States by the 
Thirty-ninth Congress, on June 13, 1866. 
On July 21, 1868, Congress adopted and 
transmitted to the Department of State a 
concurrent resolution, declaring that 
"the legislatures of the States of Connect-
icut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon, 
Vermont, New York, Ohio, Illinois, West 
Virginia, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Mis-
souri, Indiana, Minnesota, New Hamp-
shire, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa, 
Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Ala-
bama, South Carolina, and Louisiana, 
being three-fourths and more of the sev-
eral States of the Union, have ratified 
the fourteenth article of amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, 
duly proposed by two-thirds of each 
House of the Thirty-ninth Congress: 
Therefore, Resolved, That said four-
teenth article is hereby declared to be a 
part of the Constitution of the United 
States, and it shall be duly promulgated 
as such by the Secretary of State/' The 
Secretary of State accordingly issued a 
proclamation, dated July 28, 1868, de-
claring that the proposed fourteenth 
amendment had been ratified by the leg-
islatures of thirty of the thirty-six States. 
The amendment was ratified by the State 
Legislatures on the following dates: 
Connecticut, June 25, 1866; New Hamp-
shire, July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 19, 
1866; New Jersey, Sept. 11, 1866; Ore-
gon, Sept. 19, 1866; Vermont, Oct. 30, 
1866; Ohio, Jan. 4, 1867; New York, 
Jan. 10, 1867; Kansas, Jan. 11, 1867; 
Illinois, Jan. 15, 1867; West Virginia, 
Jan. 16, 1867; Michigan, Jan. 16, 1867; 
Minnesota, Jan. 16, 1867; Maine, Jan. 
19, 1867; Nevada, Jan. 22, 1867; 
Indiana, Jan. 23, 1867; Missouri, Jan. 
25, 1867; Rhode Island, Feb. 7, 1867; 
Wisconsin, Feb. 7, 1867; Pennsylvania, 
Feb. 12, 1867; Massachusetts, Mar. 20, 
1867; Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa, 
Mar. 16, 1868; Arkansas, Apr. 6, 1868; 
Florida, June 9, 1868; North Carolina, 
July 4, 1868; Louisiana, July 9, 1868; 
South Carolina, July 9, 1868; Alabama, 
July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868. 
Subsequent to the proclamation the fol-
lowing States ratified this amendment: 
Virginia, Oct. 8, 1869; Mississippi, Jan. 
17, 1870; Texas, Feb. 18, 1870; Dela-
ware, Feb. 12, 1901; Maryland, Apr. 4, 
1959; California, May 6, 1959; and Ken-
tucky, Mar. 18, 1976. 
The Fourteenth Amendment originally 
was rejected by Delaware, Georgia, Loui-
siana, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Texas and Virginia. However, the State 
Legislatures of the aforesaid States sub-
sequently ratified the amendment on the 
dates set forth in the preceding para-
graph. Kentucky and Maryland rejected 
this amendment on Jan. 10, 1867 and 
Mar. 23, 1867, respectively. 
The States of New Jersey, Ohio and 
Oregon "withdrew" their consent to the 
ratification of this amendment on Mar. 
24, 1868, Jan. 15, 1868, and Oct. 15, 
1868, respectively. 
The State of New Jersey expressed 
support for this amendment on Nov. 12, 
1980. 
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 78-33-1 
CHAPTER 33 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
Section 
78-33-1. 
78-33-2. 
78-33-3. 
78-33-4. 
78-33-5. 
Jurisdiction of district courts — 
Form - Effect. 
Rights, status, legal relations un-
der instruments or statutes 
may be determined. 
Contracts. 
Suit by fiduciary or representa-
tive. 
Court's general powers. 
Section 
78-33-6. 
78-33-7. 
78-33-8. 
78-33-9. 
78-33-10. 
78-33-11. 
78-33-12. 
78-33-13. 
Discretion to denv declaratory re-
lief. 
Appeals and reviews. 
Supplemental relief. 
Trial of issues of fact. 
Costs. 
Parties. 
Chapter to be liberally construed. 
"Person" defined. 
78-33-1. Jurisdiction of district courts — Form — Effect. 
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to 
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is 
or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the 
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration 
may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declaration 
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-33-1. 
Cross-References. — Jurisdiction of dis-
trict court, § 78-3-4. 
Submitting controversy without action, { 
11-11. 
78-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction and application. 
Court's lack of jurisdiction. 
— Procedure. 
Dismissal 
— Effect 
— Pending criminal action involving identical 
questions. 
Exclusiveness of remedy 
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
— Legal question 
Extent of relief granted 
Joinder of actions 
Quieting title 
Subjects for relief 
— Constitutionality of ordinance 
— Taxation 
Exemption. 
Right to tax 
— Water rights. 
Cited 
Construction and applicat ion. 
The Declaratory Judgments Act ( ^ 78-33-1 
to 78-33-13) is not designed tor giving advisory 
opinions in a nonadversary action, or to insure 
against feared risk. Backman v Salt Lake 
County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 375 P2d 756 (1962). 
Court's lack of jurisdict ion. 
There was no case or controversy ripe for 
adjudication in an attorney's suit against the 
Utah State Bar where the Utah State Bar had 
barely begun a preliminary investigation into 
an allegation of unauthorized practice of law, 
and, as a result, no accrued set of facts existed 
to support attorney's claim, and the attorney 
had merely received two letters of inquiry from 
the bar Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 
917 (Utah 1993). 
— Procedure . 
Proper procedure with respect to defendant's 
claim that justice of the peace court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction was a petition for an 
extraordinary writ, and not a declaratory judg-
ment action McRae & DeLand v. Feltch, 669 
P2d 404 (Utah 1983). 
Dismissal . 
- Effect. 
Dismissal of teacher's suit tor declaratory 
judgment determining status under Teachers 
Retirement Act for lack of jurisdiction was not 
res judicata barring subsequent mandamus 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICI^ DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE tfR^UTAHTIW^ >- , 
UTAH SAFE TO LEARN-SAFE TO 
WORSHIP COALITION, INC., d/b/a 
SAFE HAVENS FOR LEARNING, a 
Utah non-profit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
THE STATE OF UTAH, a 
governmental entity; OLENE 
WALKER, in her official 
capacity as Lieutenant Governor 
of the State of Utah; and MARK 
SHURTLEFF, in his official 
capacity as Attorney General of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 030909591 
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Court Clerk: Cindy Beverly 
June 19, 2003 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Motion and Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment as well as Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
(Justiciability). The Court heard oral argument with respect to 
the motions on June 16, 2003. Following the hearing, the matters 
were taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
Safe Havens is an organization which is attempting to pass a 
SAFE HAVENS v. STATE OF UTAH Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
law banning concealed weapons in Utah schools. After filing its 
application to circulate a petition to have the matter voted on 
by ballot initiative (with the Lieutenant Governor in March 
2003), the Elections Office informed Safe Havens that it will 
have to comply with certain of the requirements in the Utah 
Election Code (which took effect May 5, 2003). With this 
Complaint, Safe Havens contends retroactive application of the 
law is improper and, consequently, Safe Havens seeks a 
declaratory judgment that it need not comply with the new rules. 
To the extent this Court finds that the statutory amendments can 
be applied retroactively, Safe Havens seeks a judgment that many 
of the recent changes to the Election Code are unconstitutional 
and asks this Court to clarify what Safe Havens must do to 
qualify for the 2004 general election. 
Turning first to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
(Justiciability), the record in this matter makes clear two of 
the provisions of SB 28 are not being enforced against plaintiff. 
Specifically, the public hearing requirement and the provision 
disallowing the Lieutenant Governor from being able to approve 
for circulation an initiative if a similar one had been submitted 
within the previous two years, are not being applied against the 
plaintiff. This having been said, even liberally construing the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, as urged by plaintiffs, the Court is 
SAFE HAVENS v. STATE OF UTAH Page 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
not persuaded a justiciable controversy exists between the 
parties concerning those sections. Indeed, without a threat of 
enforcement of such claims against the plaintiff, the Court would 
merely be rendering an improper advisory opinion. Accordingly, 
defendants' motion is granted. 
With respect to plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
after reviewing the relevant law, the Court finds defendants are 
not applying the Code provisions retroactively, but rather, if 
and when plaintiff submits the signature sheets to the county 
clerks, they will apply the law in effect at that time to 
determine if there are sufficient signatures. In addition, when 
the signatures are submitted, the clerks will apply the current 
law to determine if the signatures have been submitted within a 
timely fashion (within one year of the effective date of the 
Act.) This is not a retroactive application of law, but rather, 
the application of law in effect at the time the governmental 
decision is made. Moreover, in Owens v. Hunt, 882 P.2d 660, 661 
(Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court specifically held that the 
initiative process can change during the pendency of an 
initiative. Xd. at 661. As to the case of Gallivan v. Walker, 54 
P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002), although the Court did reference concerns 
with the "undue burdening" of fundamental rights, that case 
clearly concerns itself with the uniform operation of laws clause 
SAFE HAVENS v. STATE OF UTAH Page 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of the Utah Constitution and was based upon the determination by 
the court that the multi-county signature requirement (requiring 
signatures equal to 10 percent of the number of voters for 
governor in the last election in each of 20 of 29 counties) was a 
discriminatory classification which impermissibly discriminated 
between urban and rural voters and counties. In this case, in 
response to Gallivan, there is no similar discriminatory 
classification as SB 28 requires the signatures be gathered in 
each of 26 of 29 senate districts, which are population-based and 
evenly divided. Further, the other challenged provision, 
requiring initiatives to qualify within one year, creates no 
discriminatory classification, nor is it a burden on qualifying 
an initiative to be on the ballot. 
With respect to plaintiff's arguments surrounding free 
speech, such are not implicated by any of these initiative 
provisions. Free speech and the right to vote are not concerned, 
necessarily, in initiative procedures, but only if the State 
attempts to regulate speech associated with the initiative 
process. Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204 (10th cir. 
2002) . 
Based upon the forgoing, the Court does not reach the 
arguments regarding severability. Defendants' Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
SAFE HAVENS v. STATE OF UTAH Page 5 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Judgment is, respectfully, denied.1 
DATED this ll^ay of June, 2003, 
xThe Court notes that in light of the ruling with respect to 
justiciability, this may not be the best case for challenging the 
constitutionality of the new Election Code requirements. 
Specifically, although the burdens remaining to be addressed at 
this juncture do not in and of themselves create an undue burden, 
if at some later date, all five requirements were to be 
considered by the Court, the outcome may not be the same. 
TabC 
THOM D. ROBERTS (#2773) 
Assistanl Attorney Genera) 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666) 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant Walker 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801)366-0353 
Third Judicial District 
JUH 3 0 2 
SALT MKF COUNTY By. /T'!~n 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH SAFE TO LEARN - SAFE TO 
WORSHIP COALITION, INC., dba SAFE 
HAVENS FOR LEARNING, a Utah non-
profit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, a governmental 
entity; OLENE WALKER, in her official 
capacity as Lieutenant Governor of the State 
of Utah; and MARK SHURTLEFF, in his 
official capacity as Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030909591 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above entitled matter, having come before the Court, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, District Court Judge presiding, on Monday, June 16, 2003, and the Court, having 
reviewed the Motions and Memorandums filed by the parties, the affidavits and stipulated 
facts, the argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises and having previously 
made and entered its Memorandum Decision, and based thereon, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendants* Motion to Dismiss 
(Justiciability) shall be and the same is hereby granted; it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment shall be and the same is herebv denied; it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED .AND DECREED that the Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment shall be and the same is hereby granted; it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this Order and Judgment resolves all of 
the claims of the parties and that each partv shall bear their own costs and attorneys fees. 
Dated this /[J day of _ >J$ .2003 
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Order and Judgment 
Civil No 030909591 
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